Colonial history of Southern Rhodesia
Rhodes used this document in 1890 to justify sending the Pioneer Column, a group of white settlers protected by well-armed British South Africa Police (BSAP) and guided by the big game hunter Frederick Selous, through Matabeleland and into Shona territory to establish Fort Salisbury (now Harare).
Shortly after the disastrous Jameson Raid of the BSAP into the Transvaal Republic, the Ndebele were led by their spiritual leader Mlimo against the white colonials and thus began the Second Matabele War (1896–97).
After months of bloodshed, Mlimo was found and shot by the American scout Frederick Russell Burnham and soon thereafter Rhodes walked unarmed into the Ndebele stronghold in Matobo Hills and persuaded the impi to lay down their arms, effectively ending the revolt.
Rhodesia retained the Cape Colony system, which gave voting rights to blacks and whites who owned property with a minimum value of £150 or had an annual income of at least £100.
The African population opposed it because they feared that they would not be able to achieve self-government with the federal structure dominated by white Southern Rhodesians.
It was designed to enforce private ownership of land and improve the rural economy in the African reserves, which experienced the pressure of a growing population within fixed areas.
Rather than expand the size of the reserves, the act limited cattle grazing in specified areas and provided for the de-stocking of African herds; it allowed officials to dictate patterns of cultivation and crop growing and to fix dwelling sites on farm land; it prohibited cultivating or grazing without a permit and imposed compulsory labour on unemployed rural Africans.
Implementation of the act meant the depletion of highly valued herds, reduction of the land under cultivation, and the forced uprooting of families and entire villages.
A recession in 1957–1958 hit blacks hard; rising unemployment and inadequate township housing contributed to their sense of deprivation and provided ready-made issues for ANC organizers.
As a consequence, a security crackdown in Rhodesia occurred, which was largely a preemptive strike against further nationalist organising of blacks and against potential African unrest.
It ruined the prospects for genuine racial partnership, made heroes out of the detainees, and alienated moderate Africans from the Government.
To deflate the crisis atmosphere of the state of emergency and yet preserve its sweeping powers as insurance against the future, the regime sought to normalise the exceptional measures, by incorporating them in statute law.
Furthermore, the UOA outlawed any organisation that was "controlled by or affiliated to or participates in the activities or promotes the objects or propagates the opinions of any organization outside the colony".
Attendance at a meeting or possession of books, writings, accounts, documents, banners, or insignia "relating to an unlawful organization" were prima facie evidence of membership "until the contrary is proved."
The decision as to whether individuals were "potentially dangerous" was left to the governor, which in practice meant the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs.
The tribunal rarely advised the release of detainees, and its lack of objectivity was reflected in its general report on the emergency and detention exercise of 1959, which completely whitewashed the regime's actions.
This act severely curtailed the freedom of speech of the majority and made many feel that they had no or very little lawful mechanism of havening their grievances addressed.
Like the ANC, the NDP had a rudimentary organisation, limited resources, and no access to the press; many of its would-be leaders remained behind bars.
It was shortly joined by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), mostly Shona, a breakaway group under Ndabaningi Sithole.
