[2] The theory was proposed in its modern form by Hilary Putnam in 1960 and 1961,[3] and then developed by his PhD student, philosopher, and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
The theory can be elaborated in many ways and varies largely based on how the term computation is understood.
[5] For example, the appropriate computation could be implemented either by silicon chips or biological neural networks, so long as there is a series of outputs based on manipulations of inputs and internal states, performed according to a rule.
[5] In Fodor's original views, the computational theory of mind is also related to the language of thought.
While phenomenal consciousness could fulfill some other functional role, computational theory of cognition leaves open the possibility that some aspects of the mind could be non-computational.
CTC, therefore, provides an important explanatory framework for understanding neural networks, while avoiding counter-arguments that center around phenomenal consciousness.
An early, though indirect, criticism of the computational theory of mind comes from philosopher John Searle.
[9] Putnam himself (see in particular Representation and Reality and the first part of Renewing Philosophy) became a prominent critic of computationalism for a variety of reasons, including ones related to Searle's Chinese room arguments, questions of world-word reference relations, and thoughts about the mind-body problem.
Regarding functionalism in particular, Putnam has claimed along lines similar to, but more general than Searle's arguments, that the question of whether the human mind can implement computational states is not relevant to the question of the nature of mind, because "every ordinary open system realizes every abstract finite automaton.
[11][12][13] Roger Penrose has proposed the idea that the human mind does not use a knowably sound calculation procedure to understand and discover mathematical intricacies.
This would mean that a normal Turing complete computer would not be able to ascertain certain mathematical truths that human minds can.
[16][10] Putnam (1988) and Searle (1992) argue that this simple mapping account (SMA) trivializes the empirical import of computational descriptions.
[19] In response to the trivialization criticism, and to restrict SMA, philosophers of mind have offered different accounts of computational systems.