In addition to these courts, certain administrative tribunals also have been given the power to punish for contempt, in their governing statutes.
[16] The offence of criminal contempt has been held to cover false statements made to or about the judiciary, coercion and attempts to pervert judicial proceedings by attacking witnesses, parties, or judges, recording court proceedings without permission from the court, obstructing officers of the court from performing their functions, as well as verbal abuse and accusations of incompetence or bias against judges.
Courts are required to conduct these hearings as soon as possible, and preferably on the same day when it concerns acts of contempt committed in their presence.
Persons accused of contempt have the right to be heard in their defence and courts can hear evidence regarding the case as well.
In 2020, lawyer and activist Prashant Bhushan, along with journalist and politician Arun Shourie, and publisher N. Ram, filed a petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Contempt of Courts Act again[11][25] Courts' powers to punish for criminal contempt have been repeatedly criticized by former judges and lawyers as having a chilling effect on freedom of speech, being too broad and vague in its definition and lending itself to misuse to shield the judiciary from criticism.
[26] Senior advocate Sanjay Hegde has argued that the offence of "scandalizing the court" is "incapable of precise definition", and that it derives from English law, where it has since been abolished.
[27] In 2011, retired Supreme Court judge and former Press Council of India Chairman, Markandeya Katju, called for amendments to the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 in order to allow the media to report better on law and judiciary-related matters.
The commission recommended the retention of the offence of "criminal contempt" in India, noting that courts in India continue to use it widely, unlike other countries in which offences such as "scandalising the court" have fallen into disuse.
The commission also noted that the power of courts to penalise contempt was inherent, and would continue to exist even if the act was amended or deleted altogether.