It is a wide-ranging measure introduced to modernise many areas of the criminal justice system in England and Wales and, to a lesser extent, in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The intention of the Act was to introduce reforms in two main areas: improved case management and a reduction in scope for abuse of the system.

[12] Police "stop and search" powers are increased to include cases of suspected criminal damage in, for example, the carrying of spray paint by aspirant graffiti artists.

However, no part of the Act explicitly amends the law on legal privilege, so the contents of any correspondence or expert report would remain confidential to the same extent as before.

[citation needed] The prosecution are given, for the first time, the right to appeal decisions by judges in the Crown Court which either terminate the case or exclude evidence.

Only members of the Armed Forces whose commanding officers certify that their absence would be prejudicial to the efficiency of the Service can be excused jury duty.

[21] However the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, subsequently sought to repeal the section and to replace it with new provisions under the Fraud (Trials Without a Jury) Bill.

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report recognised that the rule is capable of causing grave injustice to victims and the community in certain cases where compelling fresh evidence has come to light after an acquittal.

The European Convention on Human Rights (Article 4(2) of Protocol 7) explicitly recognises the importance of being able to re-open cases where new evidence comes to light.

The first person to be re-tried under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for an offence of which he had previously been acquitted was Billy Dunlop.

[34] The application was brought by the Crown with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, given in writing on 10 November 2005 and heard by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales on 16 June 2006, who granted it.

[36] The 2003 Act[37] extensively changed the law regarding the admissibility into evidence of a defendant's convictions for previous offences, and his other misconduct, broadening the circumstances in which the prosecution could introduce such matters.

It also imposed statutory restrictions, for the first time, on the ability of defence lawyers to cross-examine prosecution witnesses about their own criminal records.

This fundamental change in the law means that under section 101(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 the prosecution is free to adduce evidence of the defendant’s bad character subject to it passing through any one of seven gateways, unless it would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial that it should not be admitted.

The regime set out in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 was almost wholly replaced, even though it had only been passed three years previously and was itself coming slowly into force.

The Act sets out in statute the principles underlying sentencing: punishment, crime reduction, reform and rehabilitation, public protection and reparation.

The reasoning was on the basis that in order to have a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a defendant should be sentenced by an independent tribunal (that is, a judge) and not a politician who will have extraneous and irrelevant concerns which may affect his or her judgment.

Mr Blunkett said The case of Anderson deals with the Home Secretary's power to set the tariff, or minimum period a convicted murderer must remain in custody until he becomes eligible for release.

This power has ensured ministerial accountability to Parliament within the criminal justice system for the punishment imposed for the most heinous and serious of crimes.

As is proper in a democracy, Parliament will continue to retain the paramount role of setting a clear framework within which the minimum period to be served will be established.

... in setting a tariff, the judge will be required, in open court, to give reasons if the term being imposed departs from those principles.The new law applies to murders committed on or after 18 December 2003.

The terms are in the form of standard "starting points" based on age and other factors, from which any increase or decrease is then made by the sentencing judge according to the circumstances of the crime and the offender.

Judges are free to decide a minimum term of any length or a "whole life" sentence but must state their reasons for deviations from the starting point.

The legal profession and civil liberties groups were opposed to several of the measures in the Bill, though most of them were contained within the final Act.

[53] In this the disclosure provisions, the requirement of the defence to disclose details of any expert they instruct, whether or not they go on to use them[54] was referred to as a "major scandal" by Professor Michael Zander QC.

The disclosure provisions generally were described by the Bar Council as placing an "unnecessary burden on the defence which does nothing to improve the prospect of conviction of the guilty".

[58] Gill Smith, whose 18-year-old daughter Louise was murdered in December 1995, praised David Blunkett for giving judges the power to set longer minimum terms.

Her daughter's killer, David Frost, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life but with a minimum of 14 years, as he had confessed to the crime as well as expressing remorse in court.

The most inviting course for this Court to follow, would be for its members, having shaken their heads in despair, to hold up their hands and say: "the Holy Grail of rational interpretation is impossible to find".

But, we find little comfort or assistance in the historic canons of construction for determining the will of Parliament which were fashioned in a more leisurely age and at a time when elegance and clarity of thought and language were to be found in legislation as a matter of course rather than exception.