Baker[1] states that many killings done with a high degree of subjective recklessness were treated as murder from the 12th century right through until the 1974 decision in DPP v Hyam.
The actus reus (Latin for "guilty act") of murder was defined in common law by Coke: Murder is when a man of sound memory and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the King's peace, with malice aforthought, either expressed by the party or implied by law, so as the party wounded, or hurt, etc.
No matter whether brave or foolish, the defendant must expect the victim to: There are conflicting authorities on the above point, R v Jordan[4] and R v Smith.
Put the other way, only some unexpected act by a third party which places the original attack as a merely a background context, or some unpredictable natural phenomenon, will break the chain.
The unlawful and dangerous act of B changed the maternal environment of the foetus in such a way that when born the child died when she would otherwise have lived.
The requirements of causation and death were thus satisfied, and the four attributes of "unlawful act" manslaughter were complete.Lord Hope drew attention to the parallel case of R v Mitchell[7] where a blow aimed at one person caused another to suffer harm leading to later death, affirmed by the Court of Appeal as manslaughter, and summarized the legal position of the death of the unborn child: As the defendant intended to commit that act [stabbing], all the ingredients necessary for mens rea in regard to the crime of manslaughter were established, irrespective of who was the ultimate victim of it.
The death of the child was unintentional, but the nature and quality of the act which caused it was such that it was criminal and therefore punishable.Four years later, the case St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins and others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673 considered the willful killing of a foetus before birth, without maternal consent, in a medical context.
It was held a trespass to the person that the hospital terminated the pregnancy involuntarily due to the mother being diagnosed with severe pre-eclampsia.
Under this law, the intent to cause harm (mens rea) from the initial assault applies to any unborn child similarly to any other unplanned victim, and death or injury to the foetus is charged as a separate homicide whether or not the accused had actual knowledge or intent with respect to the child, or even knowledge of the pregnancy.
In the 1998 case R v Greatrex (David Anthony), the Court of Appeal summarised some of the legal circumstances this can apply:[18] [There are] two distinct paradigms of indirect responsibility for murder.
The test is succinctly summarised in R. v Powell and Daniels 1996[19] as requiring "subjective realisation by the accused that his co-participant may commit murder and, notwithstanding that, his agreement to participate himself".
It is only where the jury is not satisfied that the intent of any one defendant was to cause serious harm or to kill that participation will be negatived.
[20]In R v Gnango (2011), the Supreme Court controversially held under the doctrine of joint enterprise and transferred malice that D2 is guilty of murdering V if D1 and D2 voluntarily engage in fighting each other, each intending to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the other and each foreseeing that the other has the reciprocal intention, and if D1 mistakenly kills V in the course of the fight.
Advances in modern medicine and patient care, including stabilized states such as coma which can last more than a year before death, made this assumption no longer appropriate.
The so-called single transaction principle allows a conviction where the defendant has both actus reus and mens rea together during the sequence of events leading to death.
An offence of murder by a British subject "may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished" in England and Wales wherever in the world the killing took place and no matter what the nationality of the victim.
A stated purpose of retaining this discretion is to allow human opinion, rather than codified rules, as a final decider, due to the highly sensitive circumstances typical of such cases, and to reduce the risk of persons killing or being pressured to take their own lives, if the law were codified more concretely.
3 of 1994 considered in some depth the legal basis for murder, manslaughter, transferred malice, and the position of an unborn child who dies before or after birth, and as a result of harm to the foetus, mother, or the natural processes of pregnancy.
[35] The key recommendations included:[34] The first words Coke's definition refer to the M'Naghten Rules on the insanity defence and infancy.
As was established by Judge Devlin in the 1957 trial of Dr John Bodkin Adams, causing death through the administration of lethal drugs to a patient, if the intention is solely to alleviate pain, is not considered murder.
v English (supra) for prosecutors to make sure that an indictment contains alternative offences which carry penalties appropriate for the seriousness of the conduct of those involved.
As of 2011[update] this comprises three elements: The tariff sets the minimum time that must be spent in prison before an offender can be considered for parole.
The Practice statement (Life sentences for murder)[61] set the tariff for adults, i.e. one aged 18 or over at the time of the offence, with a starting point of 14 years as the minimum term for a case with no aggravating or mitigating factors, and lists the factors which might suggest either a higher or a lower than normal minimum term in an individual case.
Mitigating factors include a mental illness, battered woman syndrome, using excessive force in self-defence or mercy killing.
More serious cases, which included aggravating factors such as a rape or robbery, have led to murderers spending 20 or more years in prison.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 changed the law so that instead of the Home Secretary having discretion to modify judicial sentences (which might have been seen as unjustly subject to populism and political considerations), all appeals whether by the subject or by the Attorney General (for "unduly lenient" sentences) are submitted to the Court of Appeal, with the leave of that court, for a ruling.
To ensure the right of judges was used reasonably, the Act stipulated standard "starting points", and typical aggravating and mitigating factors.
While judges were allowed discretion to set any minimum sentence or "whole life" term, their reasoning for departure from these was to be provided.
Other verdicts possible cover suicide, accident, execution of sentence of death and lawful killing (formerly "justifiable homicide").
The rapid development of railways in the 1830s led to increasing outcry over the indifferent attitudes of railway companies to railway-related deaths, leading to the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (later superseded by the Fatal Accidents Act 1976) which gave personal representatives the right to bring a legal action for damages where the deceased person had such a right at the time of their death.