Italian victory The Sigonella crisis (named after the air base at which it originated, in Sicily) was a diplomatic case between Italy and the United States that occurred in October 1985.

On October 7, 1985, the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, at 1:07 pm, as it was preparing to leave Egyptian waters to dock in Israel, was seized by four armed Palestinian terrorists who had sneaked on board with false passports.

Andreotti, in the evening, convened the crisis unit at the Farnesina, immediately activating his diplomatic channels, owing to his historic friendship with the moderate Arab world whose policies he supported.

"[2] At 10:10 p.m. from the Port Said harbor master's office, the commando's first claim and demand was picked up over the radio, which was for the release of 50 of their fellow Palestinians held in the Israeli camp in Nahariya.

The two envoys were Hani El Hassan (one of Arafat's chief aides) and Abu Abbas,[4] founding head of the FPLP, whose idea for the failed hostage-taking plan in Ashdod was only later revealed.

However, it was not until later in the evening that independent confirmation of the crime could be obtained: Ambassador Migliuolo had come aboard and in the presence of Egyptian officials[note 8] began to hear from the captain what had happened.

Craxi told us to alert our ambassador Migliuolo immediately, instructing him to prepare the ground for our request for extradition for the four hijackers, since the safe-conduct was conditional on the absence of any bloodshed that had occurred on the ship.

[16] The Italian Command's authorization for the landing of the Egyptian flight[note 14] came only when the aircraft had already declared a fuel emergency and it appeared clear that it would not be able to physically proceed to Catania-Fontanarossa Airport.

A few minutes later, two American C-141 Starlifters of the Delta Force under the command of United States Air Force Brigadier General Carl W. Stiner[note 15] also landed – with lights out and without permission from the control tower: they headed toward the Egyptian Boeing and it was immediately clear[note 16] their intent to pick up hijackers and Abu Abbas, according to orders received from Washington; the runway lights were immediately turned off.

Captain Marzo received orders from the control tower to park a tanker truck, a crane and the fire-fighting vehicles locked and planted in front of the aircraft to permanently prevent them from moving from the base.

[note 17] Stiner – who had news from the United States in real time through satellite equipment – warned Commander Annicchiarico that he was in contact with the Oval Office of the White House and declared, "The Italian government has promised to hand over the Palestinians to us; I don't understand the resistance of you military men."

Reagan, faced with the Italian position, had only to give in and withdraw these military personnel from Sigonella,[note 22] trusting in the voluntary implementation of the promises he believed he had obtained during the telephone call with Craxi.

[note 23] Of the Reagan-Craxi conversation as early as the next day, two conflicting versions were circulating, regarding the number of those to be detained and their fate: for the Italian ambassador in Washington, "speaking by telephone with Antonio Badini and Renato Ruggiero, they clarified to me that we actually made a clear distinction between the four and the two.

""[21]Prosecutor Pennisi, who was in charge of the investigation during those hours, then opposed their departure, saying he was sure of Abu Abbas' guilt, but the indisputable order came to let the plane take off and the case finally passed to the Genoa magistracy, which validated the detention, also contemplating the crime of murder.

[22] Craxi's diplomatic adviser Badini places his conversation "with Abu Abbas on the Egyptair plane at a stopover in Sigonella"[note 26] in these hours: he, therefore, reported to Rome, in particular, that Abu Abbas had confirmed in the aforementioned interview that "the objective of his men was to land in Ashdod to carry out an attack, while of Klinghofer's killing he had firmly stated that he learned of it only at the landing of his four militiamen, reiterating that it was completely unrelated to the PLO's objectives.

"[note 27] At that moment, in Port Said the crew and passengers of Achille Lauro – finally disembarked from the ship – were making statements about their odyssey, and the press was consequently spreading the news that the first rumors of Klinghoffer's death were true, which would later be confirmed by the discovery of his body at sea.

To get the full picture, however, one had to wait for the description given by the SISMI commander at the time, Admiral Martini: "From a secondary taxiway, with the lights off, an American F-14 fighter of the Sixth Fleet took off from Sigonella.

On board was a Delta Force commando and General Carl Stiner, then head of United States Special Operations Command,[24][25] who with the two C-141s had diverted the Boeing to Sigonella.

[26] Egyptian Ambassador Rifaat, on the other hand, informed the Farnesina that the ten armed guards aboard the Boeing had been ordered to defend the inviolability of the plane by all means.

The ambassador declared that he could not agree with the conclusions of the Italian judiciary, and announced additional documentation that would prove the complicity in the hijacking also of the PLO leaders who joined the terrorists in the Boeing after the surrender in Port Said.

Ambassador Rabb sent Palazzo Chigi the previously announced supplementary documentation (a list, from an Israeli source, of terrorist attacks in which Abbas was suspected of having played a role) and a message from Reagan asking Craxi to exercise all his authority to detain the Palestinian leader, Spadolini called Undersecretary Amato, announcing to him his intention to request a collegial cabinet consultation on the decision regarding Abbas.

The plan went so far as to involve the Ministry of Defence, which was suspected of being "monitored" by the Americans, in the disinformation: at 5 p.m. Rifaat called, again from Giuliano Amato's office, Spadolini's deputy chief of staff, asking him for an air escort (possibly for a plane other than the Boeing to throw off any interceptors).

At about 5:45 pm, Egyptian Ambassador Rifaat and the head of the PLO's Rome office, Fuad Bitar, informed Amato that they had decided that Abbas and his companion[note 33] would board a Yugoslav Airlines flight bound for Belgrade, which was supposed to take off from Fiumicino at 5:30 p.m.

Rabb, received at Palazzo Chigi by Craxi's diplomatic adviser, Ambassador Badini, delivered another message from Reagan asking to detain Abu Abbas.

Abu Abbas, moving with the explicit authorization of the Italian government to another runway, left on a Yugoslav airliner, managing to take refuge in Belgrade: his guilt, on the basis of the evidence that emerged, was not apparent at the time (although he would later be sentenced by the Genoa Tribunal to life imprisonment) and, in the face of U.S. protests, the diplomatic passport he possessed was invoked to guarantee his safety.

[note 36] However, only a few days later (on October 16) did the CIA hand over the complete texts of the wiretaps, carried out by U.S. means, which proved with certainty the responsibility of Abu Abbas,[28] who was then tried in absentia and sentenced to life imprisonment.

[note 38] Internal opposition within the party, by then crushed on Westernist and pro-Israel positions (interpreting geopolitical reality in a strict division between West and East, considered pro-Communist), forced, on the initiative of Beppe Niccolai, the MSI Central Committee to issue a document of public support for Craxi in defense of violated national sovereignty.

Contributing to the resolution was the realization that the sympathetic attitude toward the Palestinian cause had not earned Italy immunity from terrorist acts, since less than two months later, the Fiumicino massacre[36] took place.

The result was a certain acquiescence to the Mediterranean policy that Reagan had long advocated in an aggressive sense with respect to Libyan claims on the Gulf of Sirte: in the spring of 1986, the then U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, wrote to President Reagan that "relations with Craxi were excellent," the Achille Lauro episode was now "a thing of the past," and that "on a confidential basis, Italy had allowed the use of Sigonella for support operations in connection with the exercise in the Gulf of Sirte.

"[37] This did not, however, prevent Craxi from secretly informing Libyan dictator Gaddafi of Operation El Dorado Canyon when, that same spring, Reagan decided on it as an anti-Libyan retaliation for the bombing of the "La Belle" discotheque in West Berlin.