[14] Such aspirations notwithstanding, the visit to Saint Petersburg by Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph and his conference with Nicholas II of Russia in 1897 heralded a secret agreement between the two empires to honour and seek to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.

Along with Serbia, Croatia accepted thousands of mainly indigent[19] Russian refugees led by General Pyotr Wrangel and Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky.

Until his death in 1936, Metropolitan Anthony was regarded as a leader of all the Russian refugees in Yugoslavia,[20] a country whose staunchly anti-Soviet, anti-Communist monarchist regime refused to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR until June 1940.

[21][22] During the German-Soviet War (June 1941–May 1945), the 369th Croatian Reinforced Infantry Regiment (a unit of Germany′s 100th Jäger Division of the German Army, under Croatian officers Viktor Pavičić and later Marko Mesić) was the only non-German military unit that was assigned to fight inside the city itself (unlike the Italian and Romanian troops) and went on to distinguish itself, in the Battle of Stalingrad, but nonetheless surrendered along with the German 6th Army in early February 1943.

At the end of the war in Europe, units of the Red Army′s 3rd Ukrainian Front fought in some Croat-populated territories, then mostly outside the borders of the pro-Germany Independent State of Croatia (the NDH).

[29] A number of prominent Croats in Socialist Yugoslavia had close ties with the USSR and these people's influence in the government of independent Croatia that emerged in 1991 continued thereafter.

[53][54] In February 2015, the Milanović government went ahead with the pre-planned Russian-Croatian Economic Forum held in Moscow, thus defying the publicly made warning against doing so on the part of the U.S.; the Croatian delegation was led by the minister of economy Ivan Vrdoljak.

[60] An article published in the Foreign Affairs magazine in July 2017 referred to Andrej Plenković′s government as "currently the West’s strongest ally against Russian expansion in the Balkans.

"[61][62] The visit to Russia by Croatia's president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović in October 2017 was seen by Russian commentators as a sign of tentative warming of relations that had been ″semi-frozen″ on the official level since 2009.

[64] On 26 March 2018, Croatia expelled one Russian diplomat as a show of solidarity with the United Kingdom which accused Russia of poisoning Sergei and Yulia Skripal.

In retaliation, Russia on 30 March banned the chief of staff of the Croatian foreign minister Marija Pejčinović Burić — Rina Eterović Goreta, who had from 2015 until 2017 been Croatia's chargé d'affaires in Moscow, — from entering its territory in an official capacity.

[65][66][67] According to mass media reports, some Croat businesspeople and politicians, namely Milijan Brkić, during the 2018 Bosnian general election campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina were closely coordinating their activities with Russia's security and intelligence officials, specifically Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia and previously Director of the Russian Federal Security Service[68][69][70] (in the opinion of the former Minister of the Interior of Croatia, Vlaho Orepić, published in the autumn of 2019, Milijan Brkić, while not holding any position in the government, was the de facto coordinator of Croatia's secret services;[71] Milijan Brkić was also widely viewed as the kingmaker in the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), one of the country's two major political parties,[72] as well as head of the informal "para-intelligence" grouping within the HDZ that had sought to undermine the Plenković administration, the country's judicial institutions, and individual state officials[73] and had infiltrated Croatia's state institutions such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Military Security and Intelligence Agency,[74] the activity of the latter having come to resemble, under his influence, that of "a mafia-type organisation", according to the agency's employees′ accusations published in early 2021[75]).

[76][70] According to Croatian political observer Boris Rašeta, Russia's influence in Croatia had been steadily in the ascendant and, prior to Andrej Plenković's chairmanship of the HDZ, the party's leadership had enjoyed strong support in the Kremlin.

[86][87] The latter was set up as part of the debt-for-equity swap deal agreed upon between the government-appointed extraordinary administration of the demised Agrokor, the biggest privately owned company in the Balkans founded by Ivica Todorić, and its creditors such as Sberbank and VTB Bank.

[88][89] The deal was viewed by experts as having given Vladimir Putin ″indirect leverage on the Croatian economy and on the largest firm in the former Yugoslavia″,[90] Croatia’s Centre for Development Cooperation writing that "Russia ha[d] bought itself a NATO country".

[49] Miroslav Škoro′s political movement (DPMŠ) that emerged at the end of 2010s and was hailed as Croatia's Third Way party was reported to be financed by and have strong personal connections to, PPD and its owner, Pavao Vujnovac.

[98][99] President Zoran Milanović's verbal attacks on the Plenković government as well as criticism of the U.S.′ policies voiced by him in the autumn of 2020 earned him praise from Russia's pro-government media.

[105][106] During Lavrov's visit to Zagreb that finally took place in mid-December 2020, Croatian foreign minister Gordan Grlić-Radman praised his Russian counterpart as a poet whose poems had been published shortly prior.

[110][111] On 25 January 2022, against the backdrop of a renewed flare-up of confronation between Russia and the West over Ukraine, Croatia's president Zoran Milanović, whose prior public statements and foreign policy moves Croatian political analyst Davor Gjenero had attributed to Milanović being beholden to Russia's geopolitical agenda in the region,[112][113] told the press that the crisis over Ukraine was due to the U.S.′ foreign policy and domestic politics; he also said that an "arrangement to meet Russia′s security interests" ought to be found and that he guaranteed that no Croatian troops would be dispatched in case of an escalation.

"[118] The foreign ministry of Ukraine summoned Croatian ambassador Anica Djamić, whereafter the ministry issued a comment that said, "[...] Zoran Milanović's statements retransmit Russian propaganda narratives, do not correspond to Croatia's consistent official position in support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, harm bilateral relations and undermine unity within the EU and NATO in the face of current security threats in Europe.

[132][133][134][135][136] At an extradition hearing in the London court on 7 November 2017, Agrokor's owner Ivica Todorić’s lawyer stated that the criminal case against his client was linked to “perceived Russian influence” and ″ar[ose] in part from the involvement of Russian banks and financing.”[137] In 2021 Croatia exported goods worth $272m to Russia with medication being the main component, Russia shipped goods worth $818m in return, with crude oil being the main product.