[3] Throughout the interwar period, it was widely believed that Poland was looking for any excuse to annex Danzig, and the movement of Polish military forces into the Free City was always the cause of much tension.

[2] The population of Danzig, which was 90% German at the time, never reconciled themselves to their separation from Germany and throughout the interwar period, the municipal authorities of the Free City took every opportunity to press the case for a return to the Reich.

[6] With the coming of "presidential government" in Germany led by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning in 1930 came an increase in German revanchism as strident calls were made for the return of the Free City of Danzig together with the Polish corridor to the Reich.

[7] Gottfried Treviranus, the Minister of Occupied Eastern Territory in Brüning's cabinet declared in a speech at a rally outside of the Reichstag in Berlin in August 1930: "An unjust border cannot withstand international law and the national will to live.

On December 11, 1931, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that the existing contracts did not constitute grounds for stationing Polish warships in Danzig.

[8] The fact that Papen's Defense Minister, Kurt von Schleicher was a serving Reichswehr general who was well known for his anti-Polish prejudices caused much alarm in Warsaw.

[8] The German radio, which was controlled by the government, had taken a hard line towards Poland in the spring of 1932, engaging in what the Polish historian Piotr Wnadyz called "warlike hysteria".

[13] Marshal Piłsudski decided at the suggestion of the Deputy Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Józef Beck, to use the upcoming visit of the British warships as a trial of strength, as he was highly concerned of the possibility of Herriot and Papen reaching a deal at Lausanne that would be prejudicial to Poland.

[14] The Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski, who was attending a session of the League of Nations in Geneva, was not informed of the planned visit of the Wicher to Danzig.

[11] Morgenstern-Podjazd was ordered to open fire in the event of any disrespect to the Polish flag by shooting at municipal buildings belonging to the Free City.

The tight schedule made it impossible to make the planned courtesy mutual visits at sea, and Morgenstern-Podjazd decided to welcome the British in the harbour of Danzig.

[18] In addition, Count Manfredi di Gravina, the Italian diplomat who served as the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, advised Pridham-Wippell to exchange visits with Morgenstern-Podjazd.

In particular, Zaleski promised Drummond that the Wicher would not be sent into the harbour at the same time as the Schlesien visited, thereby preventing an incident that could easily lead to a German-Polish war.

[5][20] The new agreement dropped the term port d'attache and gave the Polish Navy greater refueling and maintenance rights, but the unfriendly attitude of the Free City and the Treaty of Versailles ruled out the possibility of a permanent naval base.

[11] Wandycz wrote that sending the Wicher to Danzig was risky, especially with the orders to open fire on municipal buildings if the Polish flag was disrespected, which might have turned world opinion against Poland.

[11] The 1932 incident was the only case of Poland engaging in what might be called gunboat diplomacy, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs using the navy to achieve diplomatic objectives.

The incident led to a navalist turn in Poland, and Piłsudski increased the naval budget by ordering six-year expansion plan for the navy, consisting of two Grom-class destroyers and two Orzeł-class submarines.