David Evans (RAAF officer)
After leaving the RAAF he published two military treatises, A Fatal Rivalry: Australia's Defence at Risk and War: A Matter of Principles, as well as an autobiography.
Enlisting in the Air Force in 1943, Evans graduated from flying school as a sergeant pilot, and was converting to Beaufort bombers when World War II ended.
The Canberras achieved a high degree of accuracy on their bombing missions under his leadership, and he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order after completing his tour in Vietnam.
In this role he worked to improve the RAAF's strategy for the defence of Australia, to fully exploit the "air-sea gap" on the northern approaches to the continent.
[1] The son of policeman Selwyn Douglas Evans and his wife Eileen, David was educated at Marist Brothers College in Mosman.
[2][3] A schoolboy when war was declared, he avidly followed reports of Allied fighter aces during the Battle of Britain, and resolved that, once he was old enough, he would serve as a pilot.
[2] They had planned to wed on 29 August but had to bring the ceremony forward when Evans was selected to take part in Australia's contribution to the Berlin Airlift.
[14][15] Airlift operations were considered particularly challenging, as aircraft were expected to fly on instruments their entire route, often in inclement weather, and keep just three minutes separation.
According to Air Force historian Alan Stephens, "as they took off into a bleak, snow-filled night they found themselves questioning the worth of the sortie, an attitude which doubtless was not shared by the eventual recipients".
[21] Promoted to squadron leader, Evans's service with the VIP flight earned him the Air Force Cross in the Queen's Birthday Honours promulgated in the London Gazette on 13 June 1957.
He became personal staff officer to the Minister for Air in 1958, a position he found valuable for the insight he gained into Australia's political culture.
[2][8] In January 1963, Evans was transferred to Air Staff Division, Canberra, where he helped formulate operational requirements for a new RAAF bomber.
Operating from Phan Rang Air Base outside Saigon, under the direction of the US 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), the Canberras were initially engaged in medium-altitude missions against Viet Cong forces, guided by Sky Spot ground radar, usually at night.
[31] By the time he took command, the Canberras were flying a greater proportion of their missions at lower levels in daylight, using visual bomb-aiming methods honed during their earlier service in Malaysia; this gave the bombers an average circular error probability (CEP) of 50 metres.
Evans introduced intensive post-mission analysis to refine their technique, and permitted his pilots to bomb at the lowest level possible at which the bombsight would operate.
[29][30] Phan Rang itself was often subjected to harassing attacks and mortar fire from the Viet Cong, requiring Evans to undertake improvements to the airfield's ground defences.
He held this newly created position for the next two years, broken by a temporary posting as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff between January and August 1978.
Following America's announcement in the 1969 Guam Doctrine that its allies would have to assume greater self-reliance in their military affairs, Australia's strategic thought underwent a change from its earlier policy of "forward defence" to a more localised defensive posture.
While the consensus among RAAF planning staff was to adopt a "repulsion" concept of attacking an enemy force along the air and sea approaches to northern Australia, Evans considered that this did not go far enough in exploiting the long-range offensive capabilities of such aircraft as the F-111.
The Air Force's role in shaping an overall strategy that took advantage of the "air-sea gap" was later acknowledged in the Federal government paper The Defence of Australia 1987.
[8][44] As CAS, Evans took steps to enhance discipline, bearing and morale in the Air Force, demanding high personal standards.
His chance remark in mid-1982 to the new Minister of Defence, Ian Sinclair, regarding the suitability of Tindal over Darwin led to the former base being chosen as the home of No.
Alan Stephens described the permanent manning of Tindal as having "formalised the shift to the strategy of defence-in-depth—of defending Australia by controlling its air-sea gap".
[49][50] Late in 1983, Evans selected the site for the last of the Air Force's northerly "bare bases", RAAF Scherger, near Weipa on Cape York Peninsula.
During his speech he reiterated the need for Australia to acquire an airborne early warning capability to enhance the effectiveness of the soon-to-be-delivered F/A-18 Hornet multirole fighter, declaring that "Jindalee is not sufficient".
2 Operational Conversion Unit at RAAF Base Williamtown, New South Wales, following a record non-stop flight from Naval Air Station Lemoore in California.
[5][9] He was praised by his successor, Air Marshal Jake Newham, for his "extraordinary zeal and robustness" that helped instil "a renewed sense of pride in the Service".
[58] The same year, he was publicly critical of the Federal government's Dibb Report, claiming that while it contained "sensible policy for the defence of Australia", it did not recognise the ADF's offensive capabilities: "People win wars by taking the initiative.
"[59] Evans also stood for political office, running as the Liberal candidate for the seat of Eden-Monaro, New South Wales, in the 1987 Australian federal election.
