Jones did not actively seek the position of Chief of the Air Staff before being appointed in 1942, and his conflict with Bostock—with whom he had been friends for 20 years—was partly the result of a divided command structure, which neither man had any direct role in shaping.

His college studies were curtailed by the outbreak of World War I, by which time he had accumulated three years part-time military service, firstly in cadets and later in a militia unit, the 29th Light Horse Regiment.

[5][6][7] Amid a confrontation involving over 75 Allied and German fighters, Jones led his patrol of three Snipes in a dive on ten Fokkers, destroying a brace of enemy aircraft in the attack.

4 Squadron veteran, Harry Cobby, Jones applied to join the new Australian Air Force on 22 March 1921 (the prefix "Royal" was added that August).

[13] Nicknamed "Jonah",[14] he was also known as "Yellow Jones" in his early days with the RAAF, not through any perceived lack of moral fibre but as a result of the lingering effects on his skin of jaundice, contracted while a soldier at Gallipoli.

[3] Posted to RAAF Point Cook, Victoria, Jones was put in charge of the Motor Transport Repair Section and made acting (later permanent) Officer Commanding Workshops.

Jones spent two years in Britain from 1928, attending the Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover, and graduating top of his class at the RAF's Central Flying School.

[12][13] On 2 April 1932, he was taking off from Mascot, New South Wales, in a de Havilland Moth when he struck the perimeter fence and crashed, resulting in major damage to the aircraft and injuries to himself and his passenger.

[19] From late 1934 to early 1935, he collaborated with the Director of Equipment, George Mackinolty, on an investigation into the state of aircraft production in Australia to highlight shortfalls in local defence in the face of possible future conflict with Japan.

[22] His performance in this role led to Jones being promoted to acting air commodore on 21 February 1941, and appointed a Commander of the Order of the British Empire in the 1942 New Year Honours for "diligence, devotion to duty and perseverance of outstanding merit".

A suggestion arose that Jones' selection was a mistake, based on the government's reading of an organisation chart that implied he was the RAAF's most senior officer after Bostock, when in fact he was ranked six places below.

[28][29] Bostock was the first choice of the incumbent CAS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, but the latter's ill-concealed contempt for John Curtin's Federal Labor government helped ensure that his preference was ignored.

In the words of Air Force historian Alan Stephens, "Jones was the head of his service, but he was neither unambiguously its senior officer, nor presiding over a unified command ...

[32] In March 1943 Jones proposed that he take over responsibility for air operations in defence of the Australian mainland but General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander SWPA, refused to countenance it.

[38] By June 1944 the Jones–Bostock conflict and the anomalous division of administrative and operational responsibilities again led the Australian government to consider the appointment of a new commander senior to both officers.

11 Group RAF during the Battle of Britain, was sought for the position but negotiations were broken off when MacArthur advised that it was too late to make such a change and that the problem had now gone "quiet".

[14] One of his most controversial decisions of the war was during the invasion of Tarakan in May 1945 when he grounded Australian B-24 Liberator squadrons scheduled to take part in the attack, due to their crews having exceeded their monthly quota of flying hours.

Bostock was not consulted, and said that he would have thankfully "fallen through a crack in the boards on the deck" as he watched the attacking formations from a U.S. warship, minus the expected RAAF aircraft.

In what may have been a reaction to Kenney's threat, Jones insisted that the subsequent inquiry before Justice John Vincent Barry focus not only on the attempted resignations but on reports of alcohol trafficking on Morotai.

Though no action was taken against the pilots over the mutiny directly, two of the RAAF's best-known aces, Group Captain Clive Caldwell and Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes, were court-martialled for their involvement in the alcohol racket and reduced in rank.

Blocked initially by the Labor government of the day, it came into being in 1950 as the Women's Royal Australian Air Force, following the election of Robert Menzies' Liberal Party in December 1949.

[51][52] In 1949, Jones visited the UK with a team of advisors and recommended the English Electric Canberra jet to replace the RAAF's Avro Lincoln piston-engined bombers.

[52] Jones still enjoyed flying and made an effort to pilot each new type as it entered service, including the de Havilland Vampire jet, but his irregular turns in the cockpit meant that his skills were generally found wanting.

90 (Composite) Wing, to ensure they would operate with some autonomy rather than be dispersed throughout other Allied services as had been the case in World War II, when Australian units and personnel based in Britain had been absorbed by the RAF.

In a farewell speech at the Australian Club in Melbourne, attended by Menzies, Jones said that organising EATS and expanding the Air Force in the South West Pacific had been his greatest achievements.

[57] Following his departure from the Air Force in 1952, Jones became Director of Coordination with the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) and member of the board of Ansett Transport Industries.

[67] Despite his longevity in the position, he is still primarily known for two events early in his tenure, the surprise circumstance of his appointment, and his feud with Bill Bostock that lasted until the end of World War II.

This led to the Winjeel basic trainer and Australian industry co-partnership in the production of the CAC Sabre and Canberra jets; such local participation has continued to figure in major RAAF aircraft acquisitions.

[72] Jones refused to update the command structure of the Air Force from one based on region to one of function, something his successor, Hardman, would accomplish, and has been criticised for a systemic resistance to change.

[74] Stephens found him "a good and decent man, who had overcome considerable personal hardship in his youth to achieve exceptional professional success" but "neither an inspiring leader, nor a notable thinker".