The act received a mixed reaction from critics; while some complimented it on its simple nature compared to the previously complex common rule laws, others felt that it was too limited for what was desired to be achieved, and that the wording used was at times both too vague and too specific.

Prior to the passing of the act, builders who constructed defective buildings could not, practically, be sued under tort.

[1] At the same time, a landlord who let a dilapidated or defective house could not be sued for injuries suffered by non-tenants, something based first on the "Privity of Tort" principle that was overturned in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (that if A had a contract with B and in the process injured C, C was prevented from suing A because of the contract with B) and the decision in Robbins v Jones [1863] 15 CB (ns) 221, where Chief Justice Earl said that "a landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state is not liable for accidents happening during the term; for, fraud apart, there is no law against letting a tumbledown house".

In Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373, the courts arguably abolished the immunity of the landlord completely.

[9] Section 2 of the Act excludes "approved scheme" constructions, such as those run by the National House Building Council.

[12] Prior to the passage of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, the general principle was that landlords were not liable for injuries suffered by third parties on their property.

In addition, it only came into effect if the landlord was obliged to repair the property; if he simply had the option to do so, there was no remedy for an injured third party.

Section 4(1) establishes a general duty to repair and maintain the property, owed by the landlord to anyone who could reasonably be expected to be harmed by a breach; this includes tenants, their friends and family and also trespassers.

North praised it, saying that "The Act admirably disposes of confusion, controversy, illogicality and point-less distinctions", while admitting that the vagueness of much of it left it up to the courts to flesh out the statute.