It is commonly viewed as part of an attempt by the apartheid state to criminalise and suppress the United Democratic Front (UDF) and broader anti-apartheid movement.

The defendants were accused of having, through various non-violent political acts, sought to further the ANC's revolutionary aims, including by deliberately provoking revolt in the Vaal Triangle.

Represented by Arthur Chaskalson and George Bizos, the defendants also denied alternative charges of common-purpose murder, terrorism, and other violations of the Internal Security Act.

The appeal succeeded on the narrow procedural ground that the trial judge had improperly removed an assessor from the case on the basis of his political sympathies.

The Delmas Treason Trial was rooted most directly in events in September 1984 in the Vaal Triangle, an industrial area in the Southern Transvaal which included Boipatong, Sebokeng, Sharpeville, and other black townships.

The events in question later were the opening salvo in the Vaal uprising, which constituted a period of unprecedented revolt by the townships' black residents against the South African government's system of apartheid.

On 3 September 1984, shortly after the 1984 general election, the association organised demonstrations against black local authorities, who had recently imposed rent increases.

The protests turned violent, leading, among other things, to the killing of black councillors and residents and to a prolonged period of civil unrest in the area.

[7] The crackdown continued throughout the three-year trial, with the apartheid government instituting a series of states of emergency which restricted the activities of the UDF and other opposition groups.

[9] Counsel for the defence were led by Arthur Chaskalson and also included George Bizos, Karel Tip, Gilbert Marcus, Zak Yacoob, and Ismail Mahomed.

[11][6] Also during the trial, one of the defendants, Simon Nkoli, famously came out as gay, first to his co-accused and then publicly;[14][15] his prison letters, primarily concerning his announcement and the reaction it received, were later published.

[9] More proximately, the prosecution alleged that the Delmas defendants had attempted to serve the ANC's revolutionary aims by instigating violence in the Vaal townships in September 1984.

[9] In this respect, the prosecution concurred with national Minister of Law and Order Louis le Grange, who had announced in September 1984 that the uprising was not in fact a response to the rent increases but was driven by "individuals and other forces".

The less evident drama in progress is the slow-motion political endgame being played out as agents of the white state desperately grapple with a spreading mass movement that threatens to overload their institutional mechanisms for dealing with black rebellion... Having a judge rule that the United Democratic Front was subversive was a more palatable method of suppressing the group than shooting down its supporters in the streets.

[11] Leading co-counsel George Bizos later described their strategy as "a Socratic defence", similar to that adopted by activists in the 1956 Treason Trial: "we would admit to most of the facts but then you say far from committing any crime, I have done my patriotic duty and shouldn't be punished".

[9][4][12] Similarly, in respect of the September 1984 protests, the defence argued that the UDF had a minimal role, and that most of the organisation had occurred in independent local structures.

[6] In late November 1986, Judge van Dijkhorst ruled that, in the case of most of the defendants, there was evidence to suggest that their aim had been "the destruction of local authority in the Vaal Triangle".

He said that his decision was based on the evident "material change" in the security situation in Transvaal, with less racial unrest, but that he remained unpersuaded that the UDF three would appear for trial if released.

[9][4] He accepted, moreover, that the UDF, though it had not openly advocated violence, had "set about to foster dissatisfaction and create a revolutionary climate amongst the Black population" in order to "prepare the ground for the final onslaught by the masses" against the state.

[4] Frank Chikane of the SACC said, ''What shocked me in particular in the nature of the judgment is that you are found guilty of terrorism for simply providing leadership and for understanding the political situation in this country.

[21] In a 45-minute address to the court, he dismissed the argument that punitive sentencing would delay racial reconciliation in South Africa, saying: I accept in order to work out through a process of negotiation a peaceful co-existence, a credible leadership is needed.

[21]However, he said that he had nonetheless decided he "would rather err on the side of leniency",[10] taking into account that most of the accused had already been detained for long periods and the need to heal the wounds of the Vaal uprising.

[10] Particularly singling out Molefe and Manthata,[21] he said that those convicted "can in the future play a constructive role on the political scene, provided that they forswear the violent option and act within the law".

[21] The six other accused were convicted of terrorism but received five-year suspended sentences with stringent conditions on their political activity, similar to those imposed on the recipients of banning orders.

During the appeal, the defence argued that the prosecution had relied on evidence from unreliable state's witnesses and had not clearly defined its central charge of a "revolutionary climate".

[25][22] By the time the decision was handed down, South African state president P. W. Botha had been replaced by F. W. de Klerk, who was comparatively willing to negotiate the end of apartheid and whose government had already freed several political prisoners.

[22][23] Chief Justice Michael Corbett ruled in S v Malindi and Others that van Dijkhorst had fundamentally misapplied the Criminal Procedure Act in releasing Joubert as an assessor.

Dennis Davis of the University of Cape Town applauded the appellate judgement insofar as it freed the defendants to participate in the political transition and partly restored the legitimacy of the legal system.

In these circumstances judges are asked to perform the role of political commissars rather than lawyers adjudicating on the competing claims of a set of facts or interpreting a legal rule.