Desecularization
[2] Proponents of the theory of desecularization point to examples such as the Islamic revival since the 1970s, in particular the Iranian Revolution, the resurgence of religion in Russia and China, where governments have practiced state atheism, and the growing Christian population in the Global South.
Individuals such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud believed that this trend would continue until religion became essentially insignificant in the public sphere.
Whilst Weber rarely used the term "secularization," he is generally given credit for alluding to the idea that religion was gradually losing its prominence in society.
[4] He acknowledges that his original use of the term, referring merely to "the continuing strong presence of religion in the modern world", was "a bit sloppy".
[16] He states that desecularization can be defined as "the growth of religion's societal influence," but only if it develops in response to "previously secularizing trends.
"[14] Therefore, Karpov's development of the term essentially limited the definition to instances where religion was actively re-established as opposed to simply a state of continuity.
Other data ("mega-data") is less objective according to Karpov, because it often refers to trends in more abstract terms such as in "modern society" or civilization generally.
[17] Essentially, mega-data attempts to identify patterns on a more cosmic or global scale, whereas macro data can be very specific to nations, cities and racial groups such as church attendance and census results.
[18] The next argument is that of (2) temporal limitation – the concern that because our current concept of "society" is relatively recent, a focus on societal-level analytics (macro data) restricts sociological analysis to modernity and no other time period.
[17] Karpov also cites several implications that result from using "mega" analytics, overall suggesting that it can allow for an understanding of desecularization that is rooted both in its historical trajectory, and its presence in modernity.
[17] He concludes that whilst "macro" data can limit the analysis of desecularization, it can be compounded and used in conjunction with "mega" analytics to give sociologists a clear overall picture of a religious trend.
[21] The study explicitly made no attempt to account for how religious identification may be affected by changes in a country's economic development, political governance, urbanization and education.
Its projections are based on demographic trends, such as birth rate and life expectancy, and the existing levels of religious switching at that time.
[23] The study also predicted that between 2010 and 2050, the irreligious share in the Middle East and North Africa would remain under 1%, and in Europe would increase by only 4.5 percentage points, from 18.8% to 23.3%.
[26] Conservative academic Eric Kaufmann, who specializes in politics, religion and demography, wrote in 2012: In my book, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?
Ergo, we can expect significant immigration to the secular West which will import religious revival on the back of ethnic change.
[31] They claim that populations in the modern world are moving away from traditional or established denominations such as Catholicism and participating in religious affairs in a more individualized sense.
Furthermore, in a study conducted by Evans and Northmore-Ball, 80 percent of individuals claimed to be Russian Orthodox in 2007, with only half of the population doing the same in 1993, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
[54] Critics of the contemporary theory of desecularization such as Wilson still concede that religiosity is not trending towards extinction because of continued religious piety across the globe.
[55] They argue that this proposition is both plausible in modernity and compatible with 19th century conceptions of Secularization that foreshadowed religion's "privatization," if not extinction.
[6] Hence, critics of desecularization suggest that whilst it can account for some instances of continued and revised religiosity, it does not adequately describe the relationship between religion and privatized inquisitions and governments.
[57] He offers the opinion that the argument against desecularization becomes weakened when one considers "developments within the religious sphere proper," or what he calls "intra-institutional" secularization.
[58] Bruce offers a rebuttal to this point, claiming that the United States is simply slower to become secular due to certain structural predispositions, namely the steady rate of migration.
[60] Again, Mouzelis takes a more objective stance, suggesting that this development can be seen as both evidence for and against desecularization because such movements can still capitulate the globalization of certain faiths.
[57] Overall, critics of desecularization tend to argue that whilst religious enthusiasm is not necessarily in decline, the significance of religion in the public sphere, and as a limb of political and economic institutions, is indeed continually diminished by modernity.
