Double Jeopardy Clause

[7] In other cases, the same conduct may constitute multiple offenses under the same statute, for instance where one robs many individuals at the same time.

It was held that in the first trial, since the defense had not presented any evidence that there was no robbery, the jury's acquittal had to be based on the conclusion that the defendant's alibi was valid.

The Supreme Court ruled as such in Green v. United States, establishing the doctrine of "implied acquittal".

The jury found him guilty of second degree murder, but, on his appeal, that conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

For the reasons stated hereafter, we conclude that this second trial for first degree murder placed Green in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution.

The State of Georgia contended that since Price was not convicted on the greater offense at retrial, which was the case in Brantley, the second indictment constituted "harmless error".

The Supreme Court rejected that idea:The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict.

Further, and perhaps of more importance, we cannot determine whether or not the murder charge against petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence.

[16]Noting that the murder charge may have poisoned the jury against Price, the Supreme Court vacated the voluntary manslaughter conviction and remanded the case.

[17] Cases involuntarily dismissed because of insufficient evidence may constitute a final judgment for these purposes, though many state and federal laws allow for substantially limited prosecutorial appeals from these orders.

A successful appeal by the prosecution would simply reinstate the jury verdict and so would not place the defendant at risk of another trial.

One such case is the trial of Harry Aleman, who was tried and acquitted in 1977 in Cook County, Illinois for the September 1972 death of William Logan.

Nearly 20 years later, two persons under Federal Witness Protection came forward to state that Aleman murdered Logan and another individual, and had also bribed the trial judge to return an acquittal.

[citation needed] Furthermore, if a jury cannot reach a verdict, the judge may declare a mistrial and order a retrial as was addressed in Perez.

When the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial, even if the prosecutor or judge caused the error that forms the basis of the motion.

[citation needed] The prosecution may not seek capital punishment in the retrial if the jury did not impose it in the original trial.

[25] Double jeopardy also does not apply if the later charge is civil rather than criminal in nature, which involves a different legal standard (crimes must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas civil wrongs need only be proven by preponderance of evidence or in some matters, clear and convincing evidence).

For example, O. J. Simpson was acquitted of a double homicide in a California criminal prosecution, but lost a civil wrongful death claim brought over the same victims.

Since parolees are usually subject to restrictions not imposed on other citizens, evidence of actions that were not deemed to be criminal by the court may be re-considered by the parole board.

The non-criminal proceeding non-judicial punishment (or NJP) is considered to be akin to a civil case and is subject to lower standards than a court-martial, which is the same as a civilian court of law.

The most famous American court case invoking the claim of double jeopardy is probably the second murder trial in 1876 of Jack McCall, killer of Wild Bill Hickok.

The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, ruling that "not guilty by reason of insanity" is an acquittal: For double jeopardy purposes, a jury's determination that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is a conclusion that "criminal culpability had not been established," just as much as any other form of acquittal.

Such a verdict reflects "that the Government ha[s] failed to come forward with sufficient proof of [a defendant's] capacity to be responsible for criminal acts.

He owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws.

Similar legal processes were used for prosecuting racially motivated crimes in the Southern United States in the 1960s during the time of the Civil Rights Movement, when those crimes had not been actively prosecuted, or had resulted in acquittals by juries that were thought to be racist or overly sympathetic with the accused in local courts.

[33] Two decades later, Hennis was recalled to active duty, court-martialed by the Army for the crime, convicted, and sentenced again to death.

But if the same man while still in New York remotely piloted a drone using the cellular network and used that vehicle to commit the murder in Connecticut, then three separate sovereigns could prosecute the murder (New York, Connecticut and the federal government due to the use of the unmanned aircraft as well as interstate telecommunications).

The dual sovereignty nature of the Double Jeopardy Clause was reheard as part of Gamble v. United States, decided in June 2019.

[43] The formal name of the policy is "Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy"[44] and it "establishes guidelines for the exercise of discretion by appropriate officers of the Department of Justice in determining whether to bring a federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transactions involved in a prior state or federal proceeding."

Such a move is in line with the Courts vacating indictments wherein prosecutions were discovered to have violated Department of Justice policy.