Dual process theory
[citation needed] Peter Wason and Jonathan St B. T. Evans suggested dual process theory in 1974.
[5] Richard E. Petty and John Cacioppo proposed a dual process theory focused in the field of social psychology in 1986.
He believed that associative reasoning takes stimuli and divides it into logical clusters of information based on statistical regularity.
[9] Fritz Strack and Roland Deutsch proposed another dual process theory focused in the field of social psychology in 2004.
The model (named CLARION) re-interpreted voluminous behavioral data in psychological studies of implicit learning and skill acquisition in general.
This is called The Dual Objective Model of Cooperative Learning and it requires a group practice that consists of both cognitive and affective skills among the team.
In addition, the teacher remains, continually watching for improvement in the group's development of the product and interactions amongst the students.
The goal is to foster a sense of community amongst the group while creating a proficient product that is a culmination of each student's unique ideas.
[17] One takeaway from the psychological research on dual process theory is that our System 1 (intuition) is more accurate in areas where we’ve gathered a lot of data with reliable and fast feedback, like social dynamics,[18] or even cognitive domains in which we've become expert or even merely familiar.
John Bargh's study offered an alternative view, holding that essentially all attitudes, even weak ones are capable of automatic activation.
Whether the attitude is formed automatically or operates with effort and control, it can still bias further processing of information about the object and direct the perceivers' actions with regard to the target.
Study 1 linked found prejudice (according to the Modern Racism Scale) was unrelated to knowledge of cultural stereotypes of African Americans.
Regardless of prejudice level, participants who were primed with more stereotype-relevant words gave higher hostility ratings to the ambiguous target.
However, recent work by the ManyLabs[26] project has shown that the mortality salience effect (e.g., reflecting on one's own death encouraging a greater defense of one's own worldview) has failed to replicate (ManyLabs attempt to replicate a seminal theoretical finding across multiple laboratories—in this case some of these labs included input from the original terror management theorists.)
He showed that students consistently adjust the biases of their heuristic self-representation to specific states for the different curriculum subjects.
The brain's associative simulation capacity, centered around the imagination, plays an integrator role to perform this function.
[29][30] In the cognitive steering model, a conscious state emerges from effortful associative simulation, required to align novel data accurately with remote memory, via later algorithmic processes.
By contrast, fast unconscious automaticity is constituted by unregulated simulatory biases, which induce errors in subsequent algorithmic processes.
[citation needed] According to Alos-Ferrer and Strack the dual-process theory has relevance in economic decision-making through the multiple-selves model, in which one person's self-concept is composed of multiple selves depending on the context.
Although there is likely to be a stable preference for which motive one will select based on the individual it is important to remember that external factors will influence the decision.
Consider a historical example: should we authorize the use of force against other nations in order to prevent "any future acts of international terrorism"[32] or should we take a more pacifist approach to foreign lives and risk the possibility of terrorist attack?
[citation needed] Studies on belief-bias effect were first designed by Jonathan Evans to create a conflict between logical reasoning and prior knowledge about the truth of conclusions.
[15] De Neys[46] conducted a study that manipulated working memory capacity while answering syllogistic problems.
They examined the neural correlates on the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) activity in belief-bias reasoning using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS).
This study provided some evidence to enhance the fMRI results that the right IFC, specifically, is critical in resolving conflicting reasoning, but that it is also attention-demanding; its effectiveness decreases with loss of attention.
[15] Studies have shown that you can train people to inhibit matching bias which provides neuropsychological evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning.
Mithen theorizes that the increase in cognitive ability occurred 50,000 years ago when representational art, imagery, and the design of tools and artefacts are first documented.
[56] The dynamic graded continuum (DGC), originally proposed by Cleeremans and Jiménez is an alternative single system framework to the dual-process account of reasoning.
The DGC proposes that differences in representation generate variation in forms of reasoning without assuming a multiple system framework.
[citation needed] This dual process theory posits that we encode, store, retrieve, and forget the information in these two traces of memory separately and completely independently of each other.
