Biometric passport

Public key infrastructure (PKI) is used to authenticate the data stored electronically in the passport chip, supposedly making it expensive and difficult to forge when all security mechanisms are fully and correctly implemented.

To store biometric data on the contactless chip, it includes a minimum of 32 kilobytes of EEPROM storage memory, and runs on an interface in accordance with the ISO/IEC 14443 international standard, amongst others.

Some national identity cards, such as those from Albania, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia are fully ICAO 9303 compliant biometric travel documents.

Privacy proponents in many countries question and protest the lack of information about exactly what the passports' chip will contain, and whether they affect civil liberties.

On 15 December 2006, the BBC published an article[26] on the British ePassport, citing the above stories and adding that: and adding that the Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) network's research team (a body of IT security experts funded by the European Union) has "also come out against the ePassport scheme... [stating that] European governments have forced a document on its people that dramatically decreases security and increases the risk of identity theft.

It was planned that, except for Denmark and Ireland, EU passports would have digital imaging and fingerprint scan biometrics placed on their RFID chips.

[117] The specifications are binding for the Schengen agreement parties, i.e. the EU countries, except Ireland, and the four European Free Trade Association countries—Iceland, Liechtenstein,[118][119] Norway and Switzerland.

[121] The European Data Protection Supervisor has stated that the current legal framework fails to "address all the possible and relevant issues triggered by the inherent imperfections of biometric systems".