Jus novum (c. 1140-1563) Jus novissimum (c. 1563-1918) Jus codicis (1918-present) Other Sacraments Sacramentals Sacred places Sacred times Supra-diocesan/eparchal structures Particular churches Juridic persons Philosophy, theology, and fundamental theory of Catholic canon law Clerics Office Juridic and physical persons Associations of the faithful Pars dynamica (trial procedure) Canonization Election of the Roman Pontiff Academic degrees Journals and Professional Societies Faculties of canon law Canonists Institute of consecrated life Society of apostolic life Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is jurisdiction by church leaders over other church leaders and over the laity.
[1] Jurisdiction is a word borrowed from the legal system which has acquired a wide extension in theology, wherein, for example, it is frequently used in contradistinction to order, to express the right to administer sacraments as something added onto the power to celebrate them.
As the Church in the earliest ages had executive and legislative power in its own spiritual sphere, so also it had judicial officers, investigating and deciding cases.
On the other hand, it is clear that all the faithful were subject to these courts (when acting within their own sphere), and that, in the earliest times, no distinction was made in this respect between clergy and laity.
The decree Lamentabili sane, of 3 July 1907, rejects the doctrine that Christ did not desire to found a permanent, unchangeable Church endowed with authority.
By human law this jurisdiction is possessed by the cardinals, officials of the Roman Curia and the congregations of cardinals, the patriarchs, primates, metropolitans, archbishops, the praelati nullius and prelates with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, the chapters of orders or the superiors general of orders, cathedral chapters in reference to their own affairs, the archdiaconate in the Middle Ages, and parish priests in the internal forum.
Temporary exercise of ordinary and quasi-ordinary jurisdiction can be granted, in varying degrees, to another as representative, without conferring on him an office properly so called.
This development began when the popes, especially since Alexander III (1159–81), found themselves obliged, by the enormous mass of legal business which came to them from all sides as the "judices ordinarii omnium" to hand over, with proper instruction, a large number of cases to third parties for decision, especially in matters of contentious jurisdiction.
[2] The Catholic Church considers itself to have the right, as a perfect and independent society provided with all the means for attaining its end, to decide according to its laws disputes arising concerning its internal affairs, especially as to the ecclesiastical rights of its members; also to carry out its decision, if necessary, by suitable means of compulsion, contentious or civil jurisdiction.
This implies the right to admonish or warn its members, ecclesiastical or lay, who have not conformed to its laws, and if needed to punish them by physical means, that is, coercive jurisdiction.
The judicial power described above, jurisdiction strictly so called, was given by Christ to the Catholic Church, was exercised by the Apostles, and transmitted to their successors.
[2] From the beginning of the Christian religion, the ecclesiastical judge, i.e. the bishop, decided matters of dispute that were purely religious in character (causae mere ecclesiasticae).
But long before this the early Christians, following the exhortation of Paul of Tarsus (1 Corinthians 6:14), were wont to submit to ecclesiastical jurisdiction matters which by their nature belonged to the civil courts.
A reaction against this condition of affairs arose in England as early as the twelfth century, spread to France and Germany and gained in influence and justification the more the administration of justice by the State improved.
Some offence, especially deviations from the Catholic Faith, were by the State made punishable in civil law and secular penalties were attached to them, also to certain disciplinary misdemeanours of ecclesiastics.
Conversely, the Church in the Middle Ages increased its penal jurisdiction in the civil domain by infliction of varied penalties, some of them purely secular in character.
[2] In punishing offences of a purely ecclesiastical character the Church disposed unreservedly of the aid of the State for the execution of the penalty.
[2] When the send began to disappear, both ecclesiastical and secular judges were in general held equally competent for mixed offences.
If the accusation was brought before the secular judge, the civil penalty was inflicted by him and the action of the Church was limited to the imposition of a penance.
As regards ecclesiastics, the power of the Church to punish their disciplinary offences and maladministration of their offices, is widely acknowledged by the State.