The 1908 Official Register lists him as finishing 34th in general merit among the 112 new cadets advanced to the fourth class for the academic year beginning July 1, ranked 3rd in conduct, having accrued just 2 demerits during the preliminary period.

[n 2] An hour earlier a member of the academy staff had telephoned Curtiss during a refueling stop near Poughkeepsie urging him to land on the parade ground so that the cadets could inspect the craft but was turned down.

United States Secretary of War Newton D. Baker ordered that the 1st Aero Squadron be included in the expedition for liaison duties and aerial reconnaissance, and on March 12 it dismantled its aircraft at Fort Sam Houston and loaded them onto a train, along with all its motor transport and engineering section.

Its ten four-wheel drive Jeffery Quad trucks were the only motor transport immediately available to the expedition when the Mexican government disputed American use of its railroads, and these were impressed into service hauling materiel and men south.

Airplane mechanics untrained in the use of infantry weapons guarded the small convoy when it stopped until daylight in the village of Las Palomas before continuing on to the expedition's headquarters at Casas Grandes, Chihuahua.

[25] When his fuel was exhausted[n 12] he performed a short-field deadstick landing in darkness without damaging the airplane, coming down near a stream and what appeared to be several abandoned adobe buildings.

[26] Later Gorrell encountered a Mexican mounted on a horse at one of the nearby buildings, and through a combination of offering money and waving his service pistol, persuaded the man to take him the 20–30 miles to La Ascención, reaching it on March 21.

An article by freelance journalist Webb Miller detailing the frustrations of the pilots appeared April 3 in the New York World, causing a furor at the highest level of the War Department over criticisms of the Aviation Section's senior officers.

Using ordinary grocery wrapping paper, Gorrell prepared large charts breaking down the appropriations needed to fund expansion as a briefing aid for the Chief Signal Officer, Brig.

[35][36][37] Gorrell's initial AEF assignment was as a staff officer to the nascent "Air Service, Line of Communications" in Paris, a position eventually designated as Chief of the Technical Section.

[n 20] His job as the Air Service's chief engineering officer was essentially a continuation of the work he performed for the Bolling Mission except that the materiel he procured and the information collected were for operational use in combat rather than for APB study in the United States.

[40] In addition to studying Mitchell's views, garnered mainly from RFC commander Major-General Sir Hugh M. Trenchard, Gorrell consulted a number of individuals and their writings.

In addition to his views, Caproni supplied him with an English-language copy of Let Us Kill The War; Let Us Aim at the Heart of the Enemy, a compilation of his ideas written by journalist Nino Salvaneschi.

In March, as his attention focused increasingly on tactical support matters, Gorrell helped the GHQ staff install an "Office of Air Intelligence" in its G-2 Section that included a bomb target unit which was the model for those used in World War II.

[44] Wrote Air Force historian Thomas Greer: "Gorrell's theories were destined to lie dormant in the Army of postwar years; it was not until the eve of the next World War that they emerged again...to win at last the blessing and support of the General Staff.

[48] Jones was only able to devote a staff of five men to the program while combat continued, but he did create a small unit to produce, collect, and preserve a photographic record of Air Service activities.

[50] Gorrell recognized in Sherman's work a vital need for a much larger project encompassing the Air Service as a whole, identifying the tactical lessons learned and providing an institutional memory for future war planning and appropriations.

Jones supervised nearly 100 persons in assembling, indexing, and binding the documents and photographs as they came in,[54] and an editorial board of 30 was set up to provide material to Nordhoff for inclusion in the Final Report.

[58][n 30] In March 1919 Gorrell accompanied Patrick to an aviation commission of 12 Allied nations assembled in Paris to write a convention regulating international aerial navigation, as both his technical adviser and fellow delegate.

[14] In the month preceding his transfer, controversy had enveloped the Air Service, some of it along politically partisan lines, as a select committee of the Republican-controlled Congress investigated the deplorable record of U.S. wartime aircraft production.

[60] Gorrell was immediately assigned by the Army to assist Director of War Plans and Menoher Board member Maj. Gen. William G. Haan in formulating their stance, which also deprived the airmen of one of their most articulate exponents at the same time.

[62] If Gorrell was in fact opposed to any autonomy for the Air Service, he made no public statements or writings regarding his personal position after an initial endorsement of the report's contents during his testimony.

[4][5] While still with Stutz, Gorrell was drawn back into aviation by being named to a special committee of seven civilians[n 38] and five military men chaired by former Secretary of War Baker that was formed to investigate the Air Corps in the wake of the "Airmail Scandal."

One of the main focuses of the commission, chaired by the editor of the Atlanta Constitution, Clark Howell, was the fledgling and unregulated American air transport industry, whose alleged misconduct[n 40] was at the core of the airmail scandal.

[4] In introducing himself to the press, Gorrell predicted four improvements in the industry by 1938: standardization of aircraft, the introduction of four-engined transports capable of speeds of 250 mph, new safety equipment, and trans-Atlantic passenger service.

[68] Gorrell was expected by airline executives to become a "czar" for civil aviation in the manner of Will Hays in the Hollywood movie industry or Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis in professional baseball.

[73] By April 1938 he had not only persuaded most military leaders of both services that nationalization would be a mistake, but had satisfactorily demonstrated how the airlines could integrate themselves into a strategic contingency while maintaining their autonomy, by limiting competition among them during the emergency and using government contracts to support the war effort.

[77][78][n 46] The next day, while a deal was being brokered with Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett to turn over voluntarily more than half the airlines' aircraft[n 47] and crews to the AAF Ferrying Command (ACFC) on a contract basis,[79][n 48] the promised transports arrived at their staging points.

[80] The executive order was not revoked, however, and Gorrell moved ATA's headquarters to Washington, D.C.[80] His foresight and wariness were proven sound when the AAF reacted to early Axis success worldwide by using the EO to attempt transfer of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to the Army Air Forces.

Brigadier General Donald H. Connolly was recalled to active duty in January 1942 from his civilian position as CAA administrator and made Military Director of Civil Aviation (MDCA) with the explicit purpose of carrying out EO 8974.