North Korean special forces units like the NK 766th Independent Infantry Regiment had been successful in defeating ROK troops,[6][7] prompting Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins to order the creation of an elite force which could "infiltrate through enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks, and key communications centers or facilities.

"[8] All U.S. Army Ranger units had been disbanded after World War II because they required time-consuming training, specialization, and expensive equipment.

[8] From the Eighth Army replacement pool,[11] McGee recruited Second Lieutenant Ralph Puckett, newly commissioned from West Point and with no combat experience, to serve as the company commander.

Through a quick and informal selection process, Puckett picked the men to fill out the company based on weapons qualifications, athleticism, and duty performance.

[6] Once Puckett had selected 73 enlisted men,[6][n 1] the Eighth Army Ranger Company was formally organized at Camp Drake, Japan, on 25 August 1950.

This took place at "Ranger Hill"[6][11] near Kijang,[12] where the men became skilled in reconnaissance, navigation, long-range patrolling, motorized scouting, setting up roadblocks, maintaining camouflage and concealment, and adjusting indirect fire.

They also undertook frequent live fire exercises, many at night, simulating raids, ambushes and infiltration, using North Korean operatives that were known to be hiding in the area as an opposing force.

[11] Of the original 76 men who started the course, 12 either dropped out or were injured,[14] and as a result 10 South Korean troops, known as KATUSAs, were attached to the unit to fill its ranks.

[18] By the time the Eighth Army Ranger Company completed training on 1 October, UN forces had broken out of the Pusan Perimeter following an amphibious landing at Inchon.

[15] The Rangers' first assignment was to probe north to Poun with the division's reconnaissance elements in search of pockets of guerrillas which had been isolated during the UN breakout from Pusan.

Acting as a spearhead, they sent out reconnaissance patrols ahead of the divisional main body and set up roadblocks to limit the movement of retreating North Korean forces.

[22] About 5 kilometers (3.1 mi) into their advance, they rescued 30 U.S. prisoners of war from the 8th Cavalry Regiment who had been captured at the Battle of Unsan but abandoned by the retreating Chinese.

[14] The Rangers fought back with heavy small arms fire and several pre-sighted artillery concentrations, repulsing this first attack at 22:50.

[27] By 23:50 the Chinese began attacking in greater numbers, with an estimated two companies advancing at a time,[14] moving to within hand grenade range.

[28] The Chinese then sent a reinforced battalion of 600 infantry at the hill,[27] while simultaneously striking other elements of Task Force Dolvin, preventing artillery from providing effective support.

[n 6] The remaining Rangers gathered at an assembly area at the base of the hill[25] under First Sergeant Charles L. Pitts, the highest ranking unwounded member of the company, and withdrew.

[24] The heavy casualties on Hill 205 rendered the company ineffective,[29] and for several weeks it was only capable of being used to conduct routine patrols or as a security force for divisional headquarters elements.

[30] Yet with the company's casualties being replaced by regular soldiers who had no Ranger training it did not return to full combat capability after the Hill 205 battle.

The company participated in a few isolated missions in late 1950 and early 1951, including the recapture of Ganghwa Island from Chinese forces while attached to the Turkish Brigade.

It advanced with the 25th Division during Operation Killer in late February as part of an effort to push Chinese forces north of the Han River.

[24] During that operation the company was employed as a scouting force, probing the strength of Chinese formations as they launched raids and attacks on the 25th Infantry Division.

[31] Returning to action, the company's 2nd Platoon effected a crossing of the Han River at 22:00 on 28 February 1951 for a raid on Yangsu-ri to destroy Chinese positions and capture a prisoner.

On 1 March, 1st Platoon conducted a follow-up mission to scout railroad tunnels north of the village but had to turn back as heavy ice blocked its boats from crossing, and several men fell into the freezing water.

[32] During the first days of March, the company stepped up its patrols across the Han River, this time with a renewed emphasis on determining the locations of Chinese forces and pinpointing their strongpoints, in preparation for the next major offensive.

Through the night they established roadblocks and prepared to attack oncoming Chinese troops, but none passed through the area, and Ross took the company back to UN lines at 05:00.

[32] The company's final mission came on 27 March, an infiltration 6 miles (9.7 km) north to Changgo-ri to reconnoiter the size of a Chinese force holding there and to prevent it from setting a rearguard.

Ross then ordered 2nd Platoon to conduct a stealth attack into the village which destroyed an outpost and a food cache and caught the Chinese troops by surprise.

[32] During its brief existence, the Eighth Army Ranger Company saw 164 days of combat and was awarded a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

[39] Furthermore, he argued that the Rangers' small formation sizes[n 1] meant that they lacked the manpower to conduct basic tactical maneuvers,[40] and their employment with divisional elements did not provide them with the intelligence information necessary for effective infiltration operations.

"[38] However, retired Colonel Thomas H. Taylor, a military historian, contended in his 1996 book that in spite of their original purpose of short range infiltration, the Eighth Army Ranger Company was employed well for the missions they conducted, most of which were reactionary and borne out of a need to rapidly counter North Korean and Chinese attacks.