Energy security of China
4 The Chinese government intends to cap coal use to less than 58% of total primary energy consumption by 2020 in an effort to curtail heavy air pollution that has affected certain areas of the country in recent years.
5 Natural gas, nuclear power, and renewable energy consumption have increased during the past few years to offset the drop in coal use.
Chinese imports are a new determinant encouraging oil price rises on the world market, a concern to developed countries.
[2] International projects and technology transfers are ongoing, improving China's energy consumption and benefit the whole energy-importing world; this will also calm Western-Chinese diplomatic tensions.
[2] China is trying to establish long-term energy security by investment in oil and gas fields abroad and by diversifying its providers.
[5] Future Chinese oil reserves (such as the Tarim basin) are difficult to extract, requiring specific technologies as well as the construction of pipelines thousands of kilometers long.
In order to achieve environmental targets in combating pollution and global warming, China must ultimately improve its coal efficiency and switch to alternative energy sources.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) said China's LNG imports averaged 10.3 Bcf/d between January and October – a 24% increase over the same period last year.
[13] China's eastern and southern regions have chronic energy shortages, causing blackouts and limiting economic growth.
For supplying these regions, liquefied natural gas from Australia and Indonesia is more feasible and cheaper to import than the Tarim Basin pipeline.
However, developing this potential reserve is currently not cost-effective due to technological limitations coupled with fluctuations in world oil prices.
[19] A key point for China's energy-security goal of reducing oil imports is to improve the efficiency of its domestic energy markets by accelerating pricing, regulatory and other reforms.
[17] Recently, China has changed its anti-Western diplomatic stance to a softer, global, more efficient diplomacy with a focus on energy and raw-materials security.
The FUC Chad rebellion, based in Sudan and aiming to overthrow the pro-Taiwanese Déby, seems to have received Chinese diplomatic support as well as weapons and Sudanese oil.
The 2006 Chadian coup d'état attempt failed after French Air Force intervention, but Déby then switched his friendship to Beijing; the field defeat became a Chinese strategic victory.
[27] On August 19, 2009, Chinese petroleum company PetroChina signed an A$50 billion deal with American multinational petroleum company ExxonMobil to purchase liquefied natural gas from the Gorgon field in Western Australia;[28][29] this was believed to be the largest contract ever signed between China and America – ensuring China a steady supply of LPG fuel for 20 years.
Strengthening ties with oil producers such as Iran, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Angola and Venezuela also raised concerns for U.S. and other Western diplomacy, since several of these countries are known to be anti-American and/or known for human rights abuses, political censorship, and widespread corruption.
Lack of transparency in cases such as Chinese involvement in Sudan have raised concern in the US, until it was revealed that most of the oil produced was sold on international markets.
[35] Lack of cooperation with other major oil companies has led to business clashes, spilling into the diplomatic arena when both sides call their respective governments to support their interests (CNOOC versus Chevron-Texaco for Unocal, for example).
