The High Court held that the plaintiffs lacked locus standi to bring the action as they were not the temple's legal owners.

The Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs (appellants) had locus standi to bring the action as they were members of a Buddhist association, for whose benefit the temple property was held by its trustees.

In determining this issue, the Court held that the test to be applied is "whether there is a reasonable nexus between the state action taken and the object of the law".

In addition, inequalities arising from a reasonable administrative policy or which are mere errors of judgment are insufficient to constitute a violation of Article 12(1).

The temple property, which was located near the site of the Bartley Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station, was compulsorily acquired pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act.

[2] The Government Gazette notification relating to the acquisition published on 20 January 2003 specified that the temple property (together with another piece of land nearby) had been acquired for the construction and comprehensive redevelopment of the Mass Rapid Transit's Circle Line.

[4] Following the failure of the last appeal by the trustees of the temple, in January 2008 the plaintiffs filed an application in the High Court for a declaratory order against the compulsory acquisition.

He relied on the Court of Appeal's judgment in Karaha Bodas Co. LLC v. Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd. (2005),[7] which stated that "to have the necessary standing, the plaintiff must be asserting the recognition of a 'right' that is personal to him".

[12] Because the acquisition was not related to religious freedom, the High Court found that only the trustees who were the legal owners of the temple property had the requisite locus standi to institute proceedings if they deemed their rights to have been infringed.

The judge accepted evidence tendered by the Attorney-General that the property of the Church and the Mission had not been compulsorily acquired because they were unsuitable for redevelopment.

[23][24] Eng Foong Ho was subsequently cited in Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General (2011)[25] in support of the proposition that in order for a person to have locus standi to launch a constitutional claim, he or she must allege a violation of his or her own constitutional rights – that is, a "substantial interest" – rather than satisfy a lower "sufficient interest" test.

[26] The Court of Appeal also held that although there had prima facie been a delay, the appellants at the time had believed that the trustees and the authorities were engaged in settlement discussions that might lead to resolution of the dispute.

Bearing in mind the separation of powers, Lord Diplock was of the opinion that it was up to the legislature to decide the differentia distinguishing different classes of individuals.

[30] In Eng Foong Ho, the Court of Appeal noted that it was not necessary to discuss the principle of reasonable classification of laws which was the subject of Taw Cheng Kong, since the appellants had not challenged the constitutionality of the Land Acquisition Act.

[42][43] The Attorney-General (respondent) presented the following evidence: In essence, the Court found that the decision of the Collector of Land Revenue was "based solely on planning considerations".