In the United States of America, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) authorizes the payment of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in an action against the United States absent a showing by the government that its position in the underlying litigation "was substantially justified".
The Act is codified in scattered sections of the United States Code: Each is subject to multiple conditions.
Section 2412(d)(1) for court fees requires: An applicant for attorney's fees under the EAJA must file an application within thirty days of the final judgment in the civil action.
However, an EAJA application may be filed until thirty days after a judgment becomes “final and not appealable”.
See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), where the Supreme Court ruled that the filing period starts to accrue only after the time to appeal has expired for all parties.
[1] A party must meet the threshold requirement of having a net worth not in excess of $7,000,000 for any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization.
The government has the burden of proving its action is substantially justified or that circumstances make an award of attorney's fees unjust.
Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004) citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 567 (1988); id., at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F. 3d 503, 506 (CA5 2003); Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F. 3d 762, 764 (CA8 2003); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 314 F. 3d 1362, 1365 (CA Fed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described the substantial justification standard as requiring that the government show that its position was grounded in "'(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced.'"
Congress's inclusion in the EAJA of the substantial justification standard manifests its intent not to permit a prevailing party to automatically recover fees.
In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the government's position is substantially justified if it is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,” that is, “if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Id.
The Pierce Court rejected the position that substantial justification requires more than mere reasonableness.
See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569 (“[O]bviously, the fact that one other court agreed or disagreed with the Government does not establish whether its position was substantially justified.
§ 1988, the standards which it sets out are applicable generally to attorney's fee cases); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1983).
The movant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate for the kind and quality of legal services rendered.
Failure to adjust the statutory cap for inflation might be considered an abuse of discretion.
Some costs may be compensated by the EAJA, including federal court filing fee.
In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010) the Supreme Court unanimously held that an EAJA award is payable to the litigant, not his or her attorney, and is subject to offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes to the United States.
[2] The bill would amend the Equal Access to Justice Act by requiring the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to prepare a report each year on the amount of fees and other expenses awarded by federal courts to nonfederal entities when they prevail in a case against the United States.