Court of equity
These courts originated from petitions to the Lord Chancellor of England and primarily heard claims for relief other than damages, such as specific performance and extraordinary writs.
[5] The transformation of these courts demonstrates the evolution of equity's doctrines and remedies, changes in its dominant nature and traits, and the influence of social and political environments on its operation and underlying issues in jurisprudence.
[8] Throughout these periods, equity developed progressively from the Chancellor providing equitable relief based on personal conscience to an established and organized body of law governed by courts.
[13] Limited discretionary power was provided, determining the validity of writs issued in courts and permitting only those in consimili casu.
[16] Its formalized role involved issuing writs regarding inheritance or property transfers, which served as the justice's authorization for initiating claims in the King's courts.
This involved the Court of Chancery issuing decrees independently of the King's Council, the Chancellors becoming proficient in law, and a more systematized role in resolving petitions.
Holdsworth believed that the principles of equity were developed by and through the Chancery, and recognised three factors that influenced the evolution of such jurisdiction: antagonism to the rigidity of the common law; ideas about the function of conscience in determining equitable rules; and a procedure, distinct from that of common law, that allowed the chancellor to decide the most equitable course to take in each individual case.
[26] Subsequently, changes in the court's administration included the ability for separate divisions to obtain coexisting jurisdiction in relation to common law and equitable principles.
[28] The administrative inefficiency created by the operation of separate courts became excessively onerous, that it demanded a comprehensive overhaul of the system.
Prior to the introduction of the Judicature systems, the enforcement of equitable claims could only occur in a Court of Chancery who held the power to grant relief, and not by the common law.
[33]Concurrent jurisdiction recognises situations where the facts in a pleading brought by a party produces both common law and equity actions, with the same relief issued at either.
[34] The requirement post-Judicature system allowed a claimant to attend only one court, rather than two, to enforce both the common law and equitable principles regarding the breach and remedy.
[39] The court is required to maintain the present state of affairs, without any direct relief, until the parties’ rights are dictated at common law.
Given that equity does not pertain definitive or formal rules, the courts are required to assess explicit conduct through its flexible nature and discretionary powers.
[42] The courts address fundamental principles of good faith, generosity, morality, honesty and integrity, while also evaluating the relative fairness between the parties.
[50] Given that defamation highly concerns personal rights, post-Judicature Act has allowed a court of equity to exercise its jurisdiction to prevent the publication of false declarations determined to cause harm to an individual's trade.
[51] A limitation to a court of equity's jurisdiction in this area is its inability to prohibit the publication of false or derogatory statements detrimental to a plaintiff's profession or title to property – whereby such assertions are not attendant to threats, coercion, intimidation, or any direct attack.
[61] Scottish lawyers have raised concern that this system would create unjust decisions where cases are approached in terms of combining equity and common law reasoning.
[62] Others followed Lord Kames's view of a dual approach, whereby equity in the court existed for the purpose of creating "new equitable rules which gradually hardened into common law by virtue of their usage across time".
[65] The early amendments of the United States Constitution explicitly acknowledged common law and equity as being clear divisions of jurisprudence.
