Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, King was appointed as COMINCH, and in March 1942, he succeeded Admiral Harold R. Stark as CNO, holding these two positions under wartime Executive Order.
On the Combined Chiefs, King advocated means to attain speedy victory in Europe First in order to execute the final reconstruction strategy for global stabilization through the central Pacific War maritime offensive in Asia.
[5] King secured an appointment to the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, from his local Congressman, Winfield Scott Kerr, after passing physical and written examinations in Mansfield, Ohio, ahead of thirty other applicants.
In thinking about American maritime policy, King often recalled the influence of the graduation address as given by the Vice President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, who handed out the diplomas.
For this reason, King left the Asiatic Fleet for temporary duty in Washington, D.C., for ten days of physical examinations and eventually his appearance before the Retention Board, as chaired by the President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral Charles B. Stockton.
[34] He met Royal Navy officers of the Admiralty planning staff, including Rear Admiral Sir Roger Keyes and Captain Dudley Pound, sowing the seeds of future collaboration.
At that time, Pratt wished for King to assist experimentation and discussions of doctrine for submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious force development ongoing at the Naval War College.
[63][64] [61] [65] King appeared before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, chaired by Congressman William A. Ayres, where he was questioned about the Bureau of Aeronautics's contractual arrangements with Pratt and Whitney.
Although warned by his staff that an forthright answer could strain the relationship with the sole supplier of certain engines the Navy needed, King confirmed to the committee that Pratt and Whitney was making profits of up to 45 percent.
[72][73] King hoped to be appointed CNO or Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS), but on 1 July 1939, he reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral and was posted to the General Board, an elephants' graveyard where senior officers spent the time remaining before retirement.
However, his assumption of command was delayed for a month by a hernia operation, and then several more weeks while he accompanied Edison's successor, Frank Knox, on another inspection tour, this time of bases in the Atlantic.
[80] On 17 December 1940, King raised his flag as Commander, Patrol Force (as the Atlantic Squadron had been renamed on 1 November) on the battleship USS Texas in Norfolk, Virginia.
[82] In January 1941 King issued Atlantic Fleet directive CINCLANT Serial 053, encouraging officers to delegate and avoid micromanagement, which is still cited widely in today's armed forces.
[85] In April 1941, King was summoned to Hyde Park, New York, where Roosevelt informed him of an upcoming conference with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, at Argentia.
[102] When Turner went to the South Pacific for the Guadalcanal campaign, he was succeeded by Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke Jr..[100][101] Although he was now based at the Navy Department in Washington, D.C., King wanted to be able to put to sea himself at any time.
[123][124] Roosevelt did assent to King's proposal to create the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation (DCNO (Air)), but in a note to Knox in August 1943 he wrote: "Tell Ernie once more: No reorganizing of the Navy Dept.
[133] By March 1944, it was estimated that the Navy would reach its manpower ceiling by August, and would require 340,000 more sailors by the end of the year for ships under construction, which included nine Essex-class aircraft carriers.
It was noted that this would exacerbate the national labor shortage and adversely affect the munitions industry, and drastic measures might be required if the Army ran into more manpower difficulties, as indeed occurred.
Each U-boat carried fourteen torpedoes, including some of the new electric model, which left no air bubbles in its wake, and had a deck gun capable of sinking many merchant ships.
Roosevelt, who had been involved in the development of the submarine chaser, a much smaller vessel, during World War I, believed that small craft would be sufficient to deal with the U-boats, and that they could be acquired at the last minute, so there was no need to interfere with the capital-ship building program.
While acknowledging that small craft like submarine chasers had their uses, King pointed out that escort duty required vessels that could cope with rough weather and had sufficient crewmen to mount round-the-clock watches.
In May 1942, King established a day and night interlocking convoy system running from Newport, Rhode Island, to Key West, Florida, and by August 1942, the submarine threat to shipping in US coastal waters had been contained.
[162] As the situation in the South Pacific went from bad to worse, King attempted to get Marshall and Arnold to provide additional resources, but their priority was Operation Torch, the landing in North West Africa.
Tests that he had recently conducted had confirmed reports from the submarine skippers that neither exploder worked properly, and he secured King's permission to modify the torpedoes at Pearl Harbor rather than wait for the Bureau of Ordnance to provide fixes.
"[178] King's focus on China upset the deliberations concerning the sequence of priorities in the Pacific Campaign, which further frustrated Nimitz in relations with General Douglas MacArthur, among other Allied Commanders.
King empowered temporary Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles to act as his personal authority in China, which upset transatlantic relationships at the highest levels of Allied command [179] The deployment of a British fleet to the Pacific was a political matter.
At the Octagon Conference in Quebec in September 1944, King was adamant that naval operations against Japan remain focused upon the final war aims of stabilization in Europe and Asia.
Such a characterization failed to reflect the historical understanding and deeper commitment King demonstrated as a strategist seeking to win as quickly and efficiently as possible in the global war at sea.
When Admiral Sir James Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington, D.C., in October 1944 he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British King.
Largely through his untiring energy, efficient administration and judicious decisions this most difficult task, under extremely adverse conditions, was brought to a prompt and successful conclusion.