Estoppel in English law

English courts will consider unconscionability taking into account many factors, including the behaviour, state of mind, and circumstances of the parties.

In allowing the appeal of Dr Srivatsa against a prior judgement of a cause of action or issue estoppel, and in respectful disagreement with the judge of first instance, he said that the effect of that judge's decision was that, in the words of Mummery LJ in the case of Sajid v Sussex Muslim Society: by a neat, technical swipe the [Defendants] would have eliminated a substantial claim without any tribunal or court having heard any evidence or argument about it.

Proprietary estoppel arises when A purports to give but fails to effectively convey, or promises to give property or an interest in property, to B, while being generally aware (Crabb v Arun District Council[7]) that B will expend money or otherwise act to his detriment in reliance of the supposed or promised gift, so much so that it would be "unconscionable" not to enforce the expectation (Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees).

After his death the son, claiming to be the equitable owner, obtained a court judgment forcing the trustees to convey the land to him.

Proprietary estoppel claims, therefore do not necessarily result in the transfer of the property to the claimant; in Jennings v Rice itself, there was a monetary award.

In June 2008 the House of Lords re-visited the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, and in the process was quite fierce in describing its limits.

In Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd[12] the House overturned the decision of a fairly heavy-weight Court of Appeal on the very issue of estoppel, thereby illustrating the level of confusion about the meaning of the doctrine.

In particular he remarked that the following rationes of Deane J in the Australian case of Muschinski v Dodds[13] "repay careful reading" (his Lordship said they applied to proprietary estoppel as they do to constructive trusts): The fact that the constructive trust remains predominantly remedial does not, however, mean that it represents a medium for the indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice.

Under the law of the land... proprietary rights fall to be governed by principles of law and not by some mix of judicial discretion, subjective views about which party 'ought to win'... and the 'formless void' of individual moral opinion.Lord Scott added: A finding of proprietary estoppel, based on the unconscionability of the behaviour of the person against whom the finding was made but without any coherent formulation of the content of the estoppel or of the proprietary interest that the estoppel was designed to protect invites, in my opinion, criticism of the sort directed by Deane J in the passage cited...He then found that that was exactly what the Court of Appeal, no less, had done.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first developed in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co[14] but was lost for some time until it was resurrected by Lord Denning in the leading case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd.[15] In this case, the claimants let a block of flats to the defendants at an annual rent of £2,500.

However, they agreed to accept a reduction in rent to £1,250, because the defendants were unable to find enough tenants due to the evacuation of London during World War II.

Denning mentioned in an obiter dictum that had the plaintiffs tried to be reimbursed for the full amount they would have been estopped from doing so even though no consideration was present.

In the case of D & C Builders Ltd v Rees[16] the courts refused to recognise a promise to accept a part payment of £300 on a debt of £482 on the basis that it was extracted by duress.

The doctrine of consideration can therefore be seen as a set of rules, which play the principal role in the decision by the courts as to which agreements or promises are found to be legally binding.

The specific facts in the case must actually establish the elements of promissory estoppel before the contract becomes enforceable in law.

Lord Justice Denning is a leading figure in the field of promissory estoppel in the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd[15] was concerned with the modification of the rent payable on a block of flats during the Second World War.

Applying this principle, Denning held that a promise to accept a lower rent during the war years was binding on the landlord, regardless of the fact that the tenant had supplied no consideration for it.

They are: Woodhouse Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Board[22] held that a contract for the sale of some coffee beans was agreed to be payable in sterling.

The court held that promissory estoppel does not create a cause of action and as such the requirement of consideration in formation of contract is still relevant.

Promissory estoppel is a rule of evidence that prevents the promisor from denying the truth of statement on which the promisee had relied.

However, this requirement seemed changed in light of the decisions in Evenden v Guildford City AFC,[24] here the courts held "that promissory estoppel can be a cause of action."

It never applied to situations of part payment of debts, however, under modern law the concept of waiver has been effectively considered within "promissory estoppel".

However, Lord Denning was of the view that promissory estoppel may arise from promise made by parties negotiating contracts.

In Ajayi v Briscoe[28] the Privy Council ruled that there was no estoppel where the promisee alters his position as a result of relying on the promise yet suffers no overall detriment.

In Alan Co. Ltd v El Nasr & Import Co.,[29] Denning detained that detriment is not an essential element of promissory estoppel.

In Tool Metal Manufacturing v Tungsten,[30] The courts held that generally promissory estoppel will merely suspend legal rights rather than extinguish them.

In D & C Builders Ltd v Rees,[16] Lord Denning expressed that the: Promisor would not be allowed to revert to his strict legal rights and that the promissory estoppel will be final if promisee understood the promise to mean final extinguishing of promisor's strict legal rightsTo conclude, the above limitations help to clearly outline its parameters.

These consequences have caused the parameters of promissory estoppel to be no longer an established and well-settled area, which may interpret a huge problem to the development of contract law.

The law relating to contractual estoppel was summarised in Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd: There is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not agree that a certain state of affairs should form the basis for the transaction, whether it be the case or not.

For example, it may be desirable to settle a disagreement as to an existing state of affairs in order to establish a clear basis for the contract itself and its subsequent performance.