At the December 1941 Arcadia Conference between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Washington, shortly after the United States entered the War, the decision for the "Europe First" strategy was affirmed.
Germany's threatened invasion of the UK, Operation Sea Lion, was averted by its failure to establish air superiority in the Battle of Britain, and by its marked inferiority in naval power.
Churchill hastened to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor for the Arcadia Conference to ensure that the Americans didn't have second thoughts about Europe First.
In the spring of 1941, W. Averell Harriman served President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a special envoy to Europe and helped coordinate the Lend-Lease program.
The two countries reaffirmed that, "notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory.
Chief of Naval Operations Harold Rainsford Stark authored the Plan Dog memo, which advocated concentrating on victory in Europe while staying on the defensive in the Pacific.
This understanding, which included a recognition that Germany was the main enemy and that the major effort would be made initially in Europe, was obviously not applicable in the present situation.
[7][8] After Churchill pressed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942, Marshall suggested instead to Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the Germany-first strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific.
[9] With Roosevelt's support, and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, in July 1942 Operation Torch was scheduled for later that year.
[10] The Europe First strategy remained in effect throughout the war but the terms "holding action" and "limited offensive" in the Pacific were subject to interpretation and modification by U.S. senior military commanders and at allied leaders conferences.
[11] General Hastings Ismay, chief of staff to Winston Churchill, described King as: tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker.
War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese.
[citation needed]At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, King was accused by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, of favoring the Pacific war, and the argument became heated.
[11] Nonetheless, the inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war.