His cohabiting girlfriend for what would prove 4+1⁄2 years, Janet Eves, lived there and asked why she had not been made an owner.
Janet nonetheless took his surname by deed poll in late 1968 having moved into his earlier matrimonial house.
He accepted the evidence of Janet in preference to that of Stuart Eves, but held that she was not entitled to any share in the house.
For reasons which will be more fully stated by Mr. Justice Brightman, I am prepared to draw the inference that there was such a link; and accordingly that the result is that Janet Eves is entitled to a share in the beneficial interest in this house.
"It seems to me that this answer raises a clear inference that there was an understanding between them that she was intended to have some sort of proprietary interest in the house: otherwise no excuse would have been needed.
The Vice Chancellor accepted the following description of the work done by the appellant, most of which he found was carried out soon after the move... A second daughter was born in December 1970.
The respondent clearly led the appellant to believe that she was to have some undefined interest in the property, and that her name was only omitted from the conveyance because of her age.
This, of course, is not enough by itself to create a beneficial interest in her favour; there would at best be a mere "voluntary declaration of trust" which would be "unenforceable for want of writing": per Lord Diplock...
If, however, it was part of the bargain between the parties, expressed or to be implied, that the appellant should contribute her labour towards the reparation of a house in which she was to have some beneficial interest, then I think that the arrangement becomes one to which the law can give effect.
Applying the law in a difficult field as best I can, I reach the conclusion, without great confidence, that the court should imply that the appellant was intended to acquire a quarter interest in the house.
Also, so long as he makes good the arrears of maintenance in respect of his children by the appellant within a reasonable time, and continues to pay the instalments due in the future, a sale ought not to be ordered at the instance of the appellant in order to realise her interest in the property.
When the children are past the age at which maintenance payments are due, the court may have to consider whether it would be right to direct a sale at the instance of the appellant.