Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd

[4] In the circumstances, however, the depositors retained an equitable property in the funds they parted with, and fiduciary relationships arose between them and the directors.

In the same way, I would suppose, a person who pays money to another under a factual mistake retains an equitable property in it and the conscience of that other is subjected to a fiduciary duty to respect his proprietary right.

I have on the other hand heard a good deal of argument, and I have been referred to a number of authorities, regarding the characterisation of the same provisions of New York law by an English court.

It would be wrong for me, merely in recognition of counsel's industry, for which I am nonetheless grateful, to make observations obiter on so important a subject.The decision has been subject to "sustained, authoritative criticism.

"[2] The case was reviewed in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, and expressed doubts as to the reasoning.

"[5] This view, expressed by way of obiter dictum, was particularly criticised by Peter Birks on the ground that the more straightforward way to establish a claim would be for unjust enrichment, should trigger a proprietary remedy in a similar circumstance, regardless of the position of one's notional conscience.

Lord Millett, writing extrajudicially, has also criticised the decision, stating "It is easy to agree with Lord Browne-Wilkinson that [Chase Manhattan v Israel-British Bank] was wrongly decided, but it was wrongly decided not because [the transferee] had no notice of the [transferor's] claim ... but because the [claimant] had no proprietary interest for it to have notice of.