The eight men involved in the case were Ernest Peter Burger, George John Dasch, Herbert Hans Haupt, Heinrich Heinck, Edward Kerling, Herman Neubauer, Richard Quirin and Werner Thiel.

After the declaration of war between the United States and Nazi Germany in December 1941 following the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, they received training at a sabotage school near Berlin, where they were instructed in the use of explosives and in methods of secret writing.

Burger, Dasch, Heinck and Quirin traveled from occupied France by U-202 to Amagansett Beach, Long Island, New York, landing in the hours of darkness, on June 13, 1942.

All eight wore full or partial German military uniforms so that if they were captured upon landing, they would be entitled to prisoner-of-war status rather than being treated as spies.

The Long Island group was noticed by Coast Guard beach patrolman John C. Cullen, whom the saboteurs attempted to bribe with $260.

The two groups promptly disposed of uniforms and proceeded in civilian dress to New York City and Jacksonville, Florida, respectively, and from there to other points in the United States.

The FBI had no leads until Dasch gave his exaggerated and romanticized version in Washington, D.C. On July 2, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Proclamation 2561 establishing a military tribunal to prosecute the Germans.

The remaining six were executed in the electric chair on the third floor of the District of Columbia jail on August 8 and buried in a potter's field called Blue Plains in the Anacostia area of Washington.

[5] Royall, along with his clients, then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus demanding that the Germans were entitled to trial by jury guaranteed by the U.S. Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

[6] Royall argued that the German landings at New York and Florida could not be characterized as "zones of military operation" and contended that there was no combat there or plausible threat of invasion by approaching enemy forces.

(3) That petitioners are held in lawful custody, for trial before the military commission, and have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus.

The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.The Court ruled that the German saboteurs had no right to be given access to civilian courts because they were "plainly within the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our territory without uniform – an offense against the law of war.

[16] This memorandum was written two years before his dissent in Korematsu v. United States and a decade before his famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

"[19] He further wrote "The right to convene such an advisory committee of his staff as a 'military commission' for the discharge of his duties toward prisoners of war is one that follows from his position as commander in chief.

"[19] Nonetheless, Jackson maintained that the President's power should be "discharged, of course, in the light of any obligation undertaken by our country under treaties or conventions or under customs and usages so generally accepted as to constitute the laws of warfare.

It was very different from the scenario present in Quirin, in which the President seized enemy combatants and did not address the internal functioning of the government.

In Quirin, Jackson ultimately believed it was a mistake for the Court to review military judgments in times of war and he solidified this position in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States.

[16] Regardless of why he chose to withdraw the opinion, his memorandum offers insight into an issue which divided the Court and remains divisive today.

In Quirin, "The question for decision is whether the detention of petitioners for trial by Military Commission ... is in conformity with the laws and Constitution of the United States."

[27]Since the 1942 Quirin case, the U.S. signed and ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which were thus considered to be a part of U.S. municipal law, in accordance with Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the United States (the Supremacy Clause).

"[29] The Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the Bush Administration view of Common Article 3, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, by ruling that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions applies to detainees in the "War on Terror", and that the Guantanamo military commission process used to try these suspects was in violation of U.S. and international law.

[30] In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which President Bush signed into law on October 17, 2006.