Criminal statutes considered by the Court during this period involved assimilative crimes, counterfeiting, embargoes, insurance fraud, piracy, and slave trading.
In addition to the criminal procedure provisions of Article Three, the Constitutional Convention discussed piracy, crimes against the law of nations, treason, and counterfeiting.
[9] In capital cases, the Act provided that "the trial shall be had in the county where the offence, was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence.
[39] Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided, in relevant part, that all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of .
[40] Eleven justices of the peace of Alexandria County, D.C. had issued a warrant for Burford's arrest on the grounds that he was "not of good name and fame, nor of honest conversation, but an evil doer and disturber of the peace of the United States, so that murder, homicide, strifes, discords, and other grievances and damages, amongst the citizens of the United States, concerning their bodies and property, are likely to arise thereby.
[45] The United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia issued an arrest warrant for Bollman and Swartwout (who were already in military custody), slated the case for trial in D.C., and denied the prisoners bail; Judge William Cranch (also the Supreme Court's reporter of decisions) dissented in part on the ground that there was no probable cause for the arrest warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment.
[60]In Ex parte Watkins (1830), the Court held that the writ did not lie after a federal criminal conviction even if the indictment failed to state an offense.
[73] Several scholars have argued that certificates of division were pro forma, and that the judge and justice would merely agree to disagree, often without writing opposing opinions.
In United States v. Gooding (1827), for the Court, Justice Story wrote: We take this opportunity of expressing our anxiety, least, by too great indulgence to the wishes of counsel, questions of this sort should be frequently brought before this Court, and thus, in effect, an appeal in criminal cases become an ordinary proceeding to the manifest obstruction of public justice, and against the plain intendment of the acts of Congress.
[83] Similarly, in United States v. Bailey (1835), the Court held that the question of whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the offense charged could not be certified.
In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been asserted, and the general acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition.
I shall submit, with the utmost cheerfulness, to the judgment of my brethren, and if I have hazarded a rash opinion, I have the consolation to know, that their superior learning and ability will save the public from an injury by my error.
[96] According to Prof. Rowe, "[f]ew major controversies have ended with as slight a whimper as the battle over federal common law crimes that raged in the first two decades of the American republic.
[106] In United States v. Turner (1833), interpreting the new act, the Court held that the offense of counterfeiting was committed even if the signatures forged were those of the wrong bank officers.
[109] In United States v. Barber (1815), the Court held "fat cattle" to be "provisions, or munitions of war, within the true intent and meaning of the act.
"[110] In United States v. Sheldon (1817), decided after the war had ended, Barber was distinguished on the grounds that driving cattle on foot was not "transportation" within the meaning of the act.
In United States v. Klintock (1820), the Court distinguished Palmer—in a case involving piracy by a U.S. citizen, claiming to act under the authority of the Mexican Republic, committed against a Danish ship and citizens, under the fraudulent claim that the Danes were Spanish (Spain being at war with the Mexican Republic)—on the grounds that the victims in Palmer were not subjects of a nation recognized by the United States.
[135] United States v. Holmes (1820) distinguished Palmer on the same ground, further holding that the burden was on the defendant to prove that his vessel flew a lawful flag.
[142]In United States v. Smith (1820), in an opinion by Justice Story, the Court upheld a conviction under the 1819 statute, holding that Congress could leave the definition of piracy to the law of nations.
"[144] In a rare dissent, Justice Livingston argued that Article One, Section Eight, Clause Ten obliged Congress to define piracy with more specificity.
[158] Article Three, Section Three, Clause One of the Constitution provides that: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
[168]) Next, in United States v. Wilson (1833), the Court held that the protection of prior jeopardy extended to lesser included offenses; "[a]fter the judgment [of conviction], no subsequent prosecution could be maintained for the same offence, nor for any part of it.
Pa. 1793), an indictment for sending anonymous and threatening letters to a foreign minister with a view to extort money, Justice James Wilson argued that the circuit court could be given concurrent jurisdiction; Justice James Iredell argued that it could not; Judge Richard Peters, of the District of Pennsylvania, sided with Wilson, and the case continued.
[174] In United States v. Gooding (1827), the Court held that the government must bear the burden of proof in criminal cases "unless a different provision is made by some statute.
"[175] Also in Gooding, the Court approved of a hearsay exception for the statement of an agent of the defendant, holding that the doctrine should be the same in civil and criminal cases.
"[177] In United States v. Tyler (1812), without oral argument, the Court held that an error in a verdict sheet—referring to the goods in violation of the embargo as "pot-ashes" rather than "pearl-ashes"—was harmless because the jury need not find the value to be forfeited.
[178] In United States v. Gooding (1827), the Court held that, in general, it is sufficient for a criminal indictment to merely repeat the text of the statute.
[179] Further, the Court held that—"under circumstances of an extraordinary nature," "on very urgent occasions"—a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment could be made post-conviction.
[180] In United States v. Mills (1833), the Court again embraced the general rule that a sufficient indictment need only follow the terms of the statute.
[182] The Court recounted the history of criminal severance in English law, and concluded that the practice merely arose to prevent co-defendants from each using their peremptory challenges to deplete the venire such that too few jurors remained for trial.