Equally, unlike research in legal psychology, X-Jur emphasises the philosophical implications of its findings, such as whether, how, and in what respects the law's content is a matter of moral perspective.
Emerging in the early 2000s, and focusing initially on the folk concepts of semantic reference, knowledge, and intentional action, X-Phi represented a rejection of analytic philosophy's traditional 'armchair' speculation about common conceptual intuitions.
[12] Together, these lines of research have challenged the consistency with ordinary language of legal positivism, the view that the law's representation of moral values is ultimately just a matter of political circumstance.
[28] According to one line of objection, treating folk concepts as a basis for legal philosophy is liable to reduce such inquiry to a 'glorified lexicography' whose results will be culturally contingent, and which will be unable to point to universal and timeless truths.
[29] The range of cross-cultural or nationally representative X-Jur remains limited; there are indications, however, that at least some features of folk legal concepts, notably the role of procedural morality, may be found in both culturally and linguistically diverse locations.