[5] The decision also resolved in part the relationship between Barnes v Addy liability and the Torrens system; the court definitively stated that unjust enrichment is not the doctrinal basis for such claims.

In March 2003, Farah filed a summons in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking the appointment of a trustee for sale in respect of No 11.

[7] At first instance in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Justice Palmer found that Say-Dee had declined invitations to participate in the purchase of Nos 13 & 15.

[7] Farah's associates were found by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales to have knowingly received property flowing from that breach, giving rise to liability under the 'first limb' of Barnes v Addy.

In a unanimous judgment, the High Court allowed an appeal by Farah and restored the trial judge's initial dismissal of the claim.

The High Court considered that it was procedurally unfair to have made unjust enrichment an aspect of the ultimate decision, when neither party had been invited to make submissions on that issue.

[4] The lower court was criticised for apparent disobedience to previous obiter dicta, and for being out of step with common law holdings of other states.

[5][4] Additionally, in a 'surprisingly brief' section, the High Court held that registration of a property interest under the Torrens system; is enough to defeat a claim for a constructive trust remedy on the first limb of Barnes v Addy.

[19] One of the appellate judges overturned in the case, Keith Mason, also criticized the decision in his retirement speech; describing it as a 'profound shift in the rules of judicial engagement', and (an) 'assertion of a High Court monopoly in the essential developmental aspect of the common law', adding that 'If lower courts are excluded from venturing contributions that may push the odd envelope, then the law will be poorer for it'.