[20] With the PVA 9th Army decimated at the Chosin Reservoir, however, the eastern sector of the offensive was handed over to the rehabilitated KPA, under the overall command of Lieutenant General Kim Ung and Commissar Pak Il-u.

[22] The battle's main focus was around a road dubbed "Route 29", a strategically important line of communication to the UN forces in central Korea.

Wonju was a critical crossroad village on Route 29 which ran north to south and connects Chuncheon on the 38th Parallel with Daegu.

[26] The fighting around Wonju occurred during some of the worst Korean winter conditions, with temperatures as low as −30 °F (−34 °C) and snow as thick as 14 in (36 cm) on the ground.

[2] Just days before his death, Walker had tried to bolster the defences of the central and eastern sections of the 38th Parallel by stretching the ROK forces from Chuncheon to the Korean east coast.

[15] However, with the absence of US X Corps, the UN defenses on the central and eastern fronts were stretched thin, and there were gaps between the understrength ROK units.

[32] Taking advantage of the situation, the KPA forces had been probing the ROK lines since mid-December, while thousands of North Korean guerrillas harassed the UN rear area from their mountain hideouts.

[26] However, with most of US X Corps still assembling at Pusan, the only unit that was available in the Eighth Army's reserve was the US 2nd Infantry Division, which was still recovering from its earlier losses at the Ch'ongch'on River.

[37] In coordination with the Chinese assaults against Seoul in the western sector of the Third Phase Campaign, the North Koreans deployed the KPA II, III and V Corps, an estimated 61,500 soldiers, against the UN forces on the central front.

[16][23] The aim of the offensive was to push US X Corps back in concert with the PVA attacks on Seoul, thereby isolating the ROK forces in the Taebaek Mountains.

[16] In contrast with the professional mechanized army that had existed at the start of the Korean War, the newly rebuilt KPA formations were poorly trained and armed.

[40] Nevertheless, the start date of the Third Phase Campaign was set for New Year's Eve in order to take advantage of the full moon and the low alertness of the UN soldiers during the holiday.

[41] The winter conditions created great difficulties for the South Korean defenders, with the heavy snow hindering construction and icy roads limiting food and ammunition resupply.

[49][50] Although the UN forces managed to eliminate a KPA division at the roadblock, ROK II Corps was nearly destroyed during the fighting, and it was disbanded on January 10.

[46] Ridgway interpreted the attack on the central front as an attempt to surround the UN defenders at Seoul, and he immediately ordered their evacuation on January 3.

[62][63] Although the KPA attack inflicted little damage, the disruption caused by infiltrators in US 2nd Infantry Division's rear convinced McClure to abandon Wonju on January 7.

[60] Almond concurred with McClure's decision on the condition that the US 2nd Infantry Division would only retreat 3 miles (4.8 km) so that Wonju could be controlled by UN artillery fire.

[70] Encouraged by the heavy KPA losses during the initial UN attacks, Almond again ordered the US 2nd Infantry Division to recapture Wonju on January 9.

[72] Under a heavy snowstorm and with no air support,[71] the battle for Hill 247 continued for most of January 10, and the fighting around the French Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment became particularly fierce.

[5] The French Battalion's action at Wonju impressed Ridgway, who later encouraged all American units in Korea to utilize bayonets in battle.

[81][82] About 30,000 American infantry were deployed to the central front by mid-January,[83] and the KPA guerrillas were blocked in a narrow salient along the hills at the east of Route 29.

[8] KPA V Corps' attempt to capture Wonju had also resulted in crippling casualties, and its estimated strength was reduced from 32,000 to 22,000 by the end of January.