The two women, both white, filed suit, alleging that the University had discriminated against them on the basis of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

[10] In 2009, United States District Court judge Sam Sparks upheld the University's policy, finding that it meets the standards laid out in Grutter v.

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Fifth Circuit failed to apply strict scrutiny in its decision affirming the admissions policy.

[4] The Supreme Court again agreed to hear the case on June 29, 2015, to decide whether the Fifth Circuit's determination that the University of Texas at Austin's use of racial preferences passed strict scrutiny and can be sustained.

[21] During oral arguments, Justice Scalia raised the mismatching theory and questioned whether black students admitted to top-tier schools suffer because the courses are too difficult.

Fisher II was decided by a 4–3 decision (Elena Kagan had recused herself due to prior involvement, while Antonin Scalia died shortly before the rendering, although he opined on the case publicly).

First, the Court upheld that the university's rationale for diversity-associated goals as "sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them,"[14] despite a lack of a numerical quota.

The goals that the Court affirmed as sufficiently measurable included the "destruction of stereotypes," promotion of "cross-racial understanding," preparation of students for "an increasingly diverse workforce and society," and cultivation of "leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry."

Second, the court found that the university presented sufficient evidence to show that in the seven years between the Hopwood decision and the implementation of the combined academic-holistic admissions process, race-neutral policies and increased outreach efforts were insufficient to achieve these goals.

In conclusion, the majority reiterated that the University has an ongoing obligation to use available data "to assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary."

Though Alito noted that the articulated goals were "laudable," he wrote that they were "not concrete or precise," and "offer[ed] no limiting principle for the use of racial preferences."

In this dissent, he reiterated the thoughts expressed in his concurrence in Fisher I, namely that "a State's use of race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.