The base was also on the "Malay Barrier", the eastern forward defence zone for the Indian Ocean,[1] although strictly speaking Singapore was not required to pursue a defensive strategy.

In February 1941, the RN planned the creation and movement of the Eastern Fleet to the Indian Ocean and Singapore based on this substitution.

The basic structure of the plan remained unchanged from February 1941 to early December 1941, although the details were regularly revised.

By August 1941, there was sufficient American participation in the Atlantic to make a peacetime execution of the British Far East naval reinforcement plan feasible.

The Japanese were waiting for the outcome of the German invasion of the Soviet Union before deciding on a northern or southern expansion strategy, but were concentrating resources in anticipation of the former.

[19] In late August, Prime Minister Winston Churchill discussed Far East reinforcement with Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord.

This would be for deterrent value in peacetime, to be withdrawn to Ceylon on the onset of war; the British believed a wartime fleet at Singapore had to be competitive with a major portion of the IJN.

In agreement with August-September assessment of Japanese intentions, Churchill and his cabinet favoured the deployment of a modern battleship for deterrent effect.

[22] Crew leave prevented HMS Rodney from deploying until mid-December, and a gun refit scheduled from February to May 1942 was required before she could conduct further operations.

The King George V-class HMS Prince of Wales was, aside from the Revenges, the only worked-up battleship that could sail east before Spring 1942.

[27] Once at Cape Town, a review would decide whether to send the ship onward to Singapore;[28] this would keep Prince of Wales available to respond to an emergency in home waters.

The carrier did not receive any orders to this effect prior to grounding in Kingston, Jamaica, on 2 November, at the start of a three-week work-up.

The group was commanded by Admiral Sir Tom Phillips,[32] who had played a major role in shaping naval strategy in the Far East.

Three days later HMS Legion also temporarily joined the escort while Electra and Express detached to refuel at Ponta Delgada in the Azores.

[35] On 2 November, Churchill was notified that Pound intended to conduct the review agreed upon on 20 October before Force G arrived at Cape Town.

On 11 November, the Admiralty formally ordered Prince of Wales to combine with Repulse at Ceylon before proceeding to Singapore.

The orders also suggested - with reservations from Churchill - that the battleship might abandon its escort in the interest of speed; consequently, Force G remained in Cape Town for only two days.

[27] British plans to provide media coverage of the arrival of Force G at Cape Town for propaganda and deterrence were disrupted by the shortened duration of the visit.

I had worked out a plan with the liason officer on the Prince of Wales by which I could keep six aircraft over him all daylight hours within 60 miles of the east coast to a point north of Khota Bharu.

Six fighters could have made one hell of a mess of even 50 or 60 slow and unescorted torpedo-bombers.... As we could do nothing else, we kept virtually the whole squadron at readiness at Sembawang while the fleet was out.

[42] Phillips ordered Force Z to sortie on 8 December against Japanese amphibious landings on Malaya in the Gulf of Thailand.

Encounter and Jupiter were out of action with defects and were replaced by the First World War destroyers HMAS Vampire and HMS Tenedos.