Foreign internal defense
Unconventional warfare has historically been used in one of two ways:[5]FID exists only within a context of host nation (HN) internal defense and development (IDAD),[2][6] where it can be a force multiplier for regional commanders concerned with counterinsurgency.
At the intergovernmental level, the highest decisions will be reached between diplomats at the HN foreign ministry or department of state, with the ambassadors of the nations providing FID being key players.
A key part of a foreign internal defense (FID) mission is that its goal is to enable the nation and its institutions to move into the realm of those states that both provide for their citizens and interact constructively with the rest of the world.
McCormick's "Magic Diamond" model[20] is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency, but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success.
In a reasonably peaceful situation, he describes a "system administrator" force, often multinational, which does what some call "nation-building", but, most importantly, connects the nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate—that communication can be likened to swarm coordination.
FID can grow out of the functioning of the "system administrator", be that a single dominant country (e.g., France in Chad), or with a multinational group such as ECOMOG, the military arm of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in Sierra Leone.
... when rebel leaders in the oil-rich Niger delta vowed to launch an "all-out war on the Nigerian state," instability helped propel global oil prices to more than $50 per barrel.
Consistent with the restrictions on military organizations performing civilian law enforcement, such as the US Posse Comitatus Act, homeland and FID personnel can cooperate with partner nations (PN) in their counterdrug (CD) effort to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs into the US.
While Special Forces medical personnel can deliver clinic services and train local workers, there is an entire spectrum of ways to use FID to enhance public health.
"[22] Reconfigured, the G-20 (i.e., members of the G8 and major emerging markets such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa) could play a vital role in brokering consensus on a wide range of intractable political and security issues.
In some FID situations, there can be an enormous benefit, both for health through proper diet and for economic development, to bring in experts on sustainable agriculture, and resources that the local inhabitants can use independently, such as improved breeding stock.
No single operational plan will fit all HN environments, and it is wise to consider the various counterinsurgency models and see if the proposed plan will work to fill the identified gaps, weaknesses, and disconnection A representative set of steps for the FID force[5] is: The end state is a legitimate government that the population trusts and is able to detect and defeat internal and external threats.Cordesman points out that military force, used to excess, may be worse for the long-term situation than not engaging the insurgents at all.
If there is no refueling capability at the destination, the aircraft must cut into their cargo capacity so that they carry enough fuel for the return trip; this is a serious limitation on transport flights from Lagos, Nigeria to El Fasher airport in Darfur, Sudan.
If there is an answer, it lies in persuading the great majority of Muslims (totaling some 2 billion people) to choose modernity and moderation, and to reject the blind alley offered by its nihilist minority.
In this context, a $200,000 State Department program aimed at explaining the basic tenets and promises of American democracy to future leaders of South Asia looks more cost effective than a $400 billion defense budget.
Third, in using short-term measures to resolve complex crises, an external power must be careful not to inadvertently exacerbate the situation or create new problems altogether.Anti-Soviet activities in Afghanistan left it in a civil war.
Where a problem involves economics, such as drugs in Latin America or diamonds in West Africa, other nations and civilizations have to work on the demand side, rather than requiring the HN to destroy what may have become an integral part of its economy.
Cordesman uses much the same argument as Eizenstat's legitimacy gap by saying "Algeria, Egypt, and Syria have already shown that "long wars" fought on this basis may bring the threat under partial control but cannot defeat it.
Marighella recommended that urban guerillas deliberately provoke the government into overreaction, as a means of reducing its legitimacy;[47] the doctrine of having FID trainers counsel respect for human rights has pure military, not just humanitarian, justification.
What is in the open or under visible camouflage nets elsewhere is completely hidden within structures during urban contingencies (i.e., defeating conventional imagery intelligence IMINT) Further, movement of units is less frequently evident.
Another example is where HN personnel guide a successful rescue effort in denied area, as Nguyen Van Kiet did with a United States Navy SEAL companion, Thomas R. Norris behind enemy lines.
[64] By 1967, the counterinsurgency military and civilian efforts in the South Vietnam were consolidated under the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) command, which was shared between Saigon government, U.S. MACV and the CIA.
Among CORDS multiple activities, the controversial Phoenix Program aimed at neutralizing the cadres of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in South Vietnam, who created and executed a shadow system of government in the rural areas, stands out.
"Hundreds of thousands of military personnel, civilians, Vietnamese nationals, intelligence experts, and analysts" collected and assessed the insurgency related information from 44 provinces, 257 districts, 2,464 villages, and 11,729 hamlets in South Vietnam to aid in decision making and charting the counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.
[77] This level of surveillance created a flow of intelligence that gave Special Forces teams the ability to conduct almost nightly raids against key targets in order to dismantle insurgency networks more effectively.
[79] In an effort to reducing the export of heroin from Afghanistan,[dubious – discuss] the United States committed a large number of resources to the Colombian government to combat the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) insurgency in Colombia.
[citation needed] Western powers conducting multiple foreign internal defense operations are coming under increasing pressure to provide human rights and Geneva Conventions training to host nation personnel, although the results vary.
[citation needed] Part of the challenge arrives when host nation personnel get involved in combat without FID advisers, who are supposed to monitor their conduct and prevent abuses.
[5] In one particular case which occurred in December 1981, the US-trained Salvadoran army's elite counter-insurgency unit, the Atlácatl Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Domingo Monterrosa, willingly committed retaliation killings at El Mozote, Morazan province, just two days after returning home from the US where they had trained in counter insurgency warfare.
[83]Returning to the El Mozote massacre, it was duly reported to the American public by Ray Bonner from The New York Times and Anna Guillermoprieto from The Washington Post, however, the U.S. State Department denied the participation of the Salvadoran army in mass murder.
