Forward air control during the Vietnam War
Present as advisors under Farm Gate, FACs grew even more important as American troops poured into Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
[2] The airborne FAC flew the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog or other light aircraft slowly over the rough terrain at low altitude to maintain constant aerial surveillance.
However, rough terrain, limited sight lines, and difficulty in communication always seriously hindered ground FAC efforts in Southeast Asia.
[18][19] On 25 January 1963, the ROE were updated to establish some free-fire zones containing only enemy troops; permission was not needed to place an air strike there.
Several hundred refugees moving on Route 9 from Khe Sanh to Lang Vei were spared an artillery barrage when Captain Charles Rushforth identified them as a non-military target.
He was supported by Tactical Air Control Parties co-located with ground forces' headquarters ranging down to the regimental, brigade, or battalion level.
[34] On 8 December 1961, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff granted the newly re-established 1st Air Commando Group authority to strike communist insurgents.
[34] In April 1962, a USAF study concluded only 32 American FACs were required for Vietnam service; by the time the last of the 32 had been assigned a year later, they were obviously insufficient.
[18][40] After the Gulf of Tonkin incident served as the American casus belli in August 1964, the United States began to add large numbers of ground troops needing air support in South Vietnam.
In September 1965, the USAF's 12th Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) landed in Vietnam to begin management of the FAC force.
It not only kept track of all other aircraft, it served "to assure proper execution of the fragged missions and to act as, a central control agency in diversion of the strike force to secondary and lucrative targets."
[47] By early 1965, the USAF had realized that TACAN radar was a near-necessity for bombing operations, due to the lack of reliable maps and other navigation aids.
[55] One of them, Flight Lieutenant Garry Cooper (see Further reading section below), served with such distinction he was recommended for the Medal of Honor by Major General Julian Ewell.
When he proved unequal to handling the volume of incoming air support, a Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star was assigned to the task in December 1970.
In 1966, the U.S. used FACs from the 20th TASS, flying O-1 Bird Dogs and later O-2 Skymasters, to direct air strikes in the Route Pack 1 portion of Rolling Thunder.
[71] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed his rise to power and established themselves and their Thai mercenaries as the prime advisers to the Lao armed forces.
[72] On 29 May 1961, because there could be no military advisory group in Laos, U.S. President John F. Kennedy granted the Ambassador control of all American paramilitary activities within that country.
[75] The initial use of forward air control in northern Laos was a sub rosa effort by both airborne and ground FACs during 19–29 July 1964 for Operation Triangle.
It would eventually develop into an intricate system of over 3,000 miles of interweaving roadways, trails, and truck parks running down the eastern edge of the Vietnamese/Laotian border.
[94] In July 1966, A-26 Invaders using the call sign "Nimrod" began night operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail with support from multi-engine flareships.
[96] Also in 1966, the U.S. Air Force began experimenting with various night vision devices for FAC use, under the code name Operation Shed Light.
[94] By late 1966, the scope was being used for FACing along the southern Ho Chi Minh Trail from C-130 Hercules flareships under the call sign "Blind Bat".
C-123 Providers of the 606th Special Operations Squadron, under the call sign "Candlestick", filled a similar role over the northern end of the Trail.
However, the Battle of Khe Sanh sidetracked sensor usage from the Ho Chi Minh Trail to track the communists besieging the U.S. Marines in the embattled fire base.
[100] In January 1968, four A-1 Skyraiders modified to carry two low-light-level television cameras were assigned to Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Base.
[101] On 1 November 1968, President Lyndon Baines Johnson declared a halt to bombing in North Vietnam, thus suspending Operation Rolling Thunder.
Immediately, with North Vietnamese targets off limits, the air power directed at the Ho Chi Minh Trail nearly quintupled, rising from 140 to 620 sorties per day.
When these spectacular results were added to those of other units interdicting the Trail, it became apparent that if the damage assessments were correct, the North Vietnamese were out of usable trucks.
According to the 16th: According to Vietnam Magazine, on 12 May 1971, these criteria were tested with a staged firepower demonstration by an AC-130, directed against eight targeted trucks on a bombing range near Bien Hoa AB.
Despite the expense, Igloo White's emphasis on interdicting supply trucks instead of enemy troops failed to deter continuing communist offensives in South Vietnam.
