Francisco Javier Arana Castro (Latin American Spanish: [fɾanˈsisko xaˈβjeɾ aˈɾana ˈkastɾo]; 3 December 1905 – 18 July 1949) was a Guatemalan military leader and one of the three members of the revolutionary junta that ruled Guatemala from 20 October 1944 to 15 March 1945 during the early part of the Guatemalan Revolution.

He led the three-man junta that oversaw the transition to a democratic government, although he was personally reluctant to allow the elected President Juan José Arévalo to take office in 1945.

[2] He did not have a formal education, but he was relatively well read, and was described by his contemporaries as canny and intelligent, and as a charismatic and convivial person.

[2] In 1946, during the Guatemalan Revolution, a staff member at the United States embassy described his politics as nationalist, as well as being slightly pro-American.

[3] Ubico appointed Federico Ponce Vaides leader of a three-person junta which would lead the provisional government.

[4][5] Ponce pledged to hold free elections soon, while continuing Ubico's policy of suppressing the protests.

Initially, the battle went against the revolutionaries, but after an appeal for support their ranks were swelled by unionists and students, and they eventually subdued the police and army factions loyal to Ponce Vaides.

A handful of its leaders approached Arana and made a deal with him, which later came to be known as the Pacto del Barranco (Pact of the Ravine).

[13] Although Guatemala was not completely democratized by the Guatemalan Revolution (illiterate women, for example, were still denied the vote) it nonetheless brought about substantial labor reforms.

[15] Thus, a number of wealthy Guatemalans began to cultivate Arana's support against the labor reforms of Arévalo.

The leftist parties decided to back Árbenz instead, as they believed that only a military officer could defeat Arana.

Specifically, they wanted the election to be supervised by regional commanders loyal to Arana, rather than centrally dispatched observers.

Arana's supporters in the military rose up in revolt, but they were leaderless, and by the next day the rebels asked for negotiations.

Árbenz and a few others had disagreed with its thrust, and suggested that the entire truth be told; however, they were overruled by the majority of the ministers.

[22] Historian Piero Gleijeses stated that if Arana had attempted a coup without delivering an ultimatum, he would likely have succeeded.

However, his overconfidence in his hold over the military, as well as his lingering desire to take power in a legitimate manner, led to his effort being sabotaged before it truly began.