The next year, in 1882, the French Government requested from the Moroccans permission to construct the Trans-Saharan Railroad along the route leading from the Oued Zousfana to the Touat.
Fearing that the French might nevertheless continue their advance towards the south, in 1883, the Moroccans placed an amel (a governor) at the oasis of Figuig, on the upper reaches of the Oued Zousfana.
In 1885 French troops crossed the crest of the Saharan Atlas and began to construct a post at Djéniene Bourzeg, a water hole strategically situated in a mountain corridor that led directly to the valley of the Zousfana to the south of Figuig.
In executing this policy they worked to prevent the reformation of the Moroccan Government under Moulay Abd al-Aziz while at the same time drawing it towards greater recognition of France's special interests in Morocco by continually raising problems connected with incidents on the frontier with Algeria.
[12] Attacks by the Beni Guil, Doui Menia, Oulad Djerir, Aït Atta, and by pillagers emanating from Figuig continued on the frontier throughout all of the latter part of 1902 and during much of the year 1903.
In October 1903, after further attacks had been perpetrated against the French troops stationed in the Zousfana, Paris agreed to the installation of a post west Béchar.
[15] In 1900 the French agreed to recognize the predominance of Italy's interests in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in exchange for an Italian assurance that, as far as they were concerned, France might have a “free hand” in Morocco.
[16] Negotiations with Spain over Morocco failed in 1902 because of disagreement over the limits of the future Spanish zone and the insistence of the French on reserving to themselves the right of intervention in it.
[19] Britain, Belgium and France made defensive preparations — the French reinforced units, trained reservists and procured arms — to signal their determination.
The French knew that they were weak and did not wish to provoke the Germans, and Delcassé, the foreign minister, who alone advocated firmness, was forced to resign from the cabinet.
Bernhard von Bülow, the German chancellor, alive to the danger of escalation, had no intention of risking a European war over African concessions.
The French, anxious to avoid conflict with Germany, and relying on the diplomatic support of Britain, Spain and Italy, agreed to the demand in July.
[21] After nearly three months of diplomatic wrangling the powers adopted the Act of Algeciras on 7 April which provided for ‘reforms’ amounting to a joint Franco-Spanish control of Morocco's police and finances.
[20] The sultan, realizing that Britain had relinquished her role as protector of the Moroccan makhzen and seeing Germany unable to restrain France, accepted the Act of Algeciras.
[21] The assassination of the French physician Émile Mauchamp, who was chosen by decree of the minister of foreign affairs to go from Jerusalem to Morocco and run a pharmacy and suspected of conspiring to lay the groundwork for French takeover of Morocco, in Marrakesh on 19 March 1907 led to Hubert Lyautey sending soldiers across the border to occupy the important town of Oujda on March 29.
The bay'ah made a series of demands: that the new sultan should undertake the jihad neglected by his predecessor; that he liberate Oujda and Casablanca and end the protégé system.
Abandoned by his men, his jallaba shredded by bullets, the ex-sultan fled to the safety of French-held Casablanca, where he announced his abdication two days later.
[30] Further north the French forces at Oujda advanced westwards, established a base at Taourirt in June 1910 and started to send patrols along the way leading to Fes.
[31] Following the allowance of its interests and recognition of its influence in northern Morocco through the Entente Cordiale (1904), Algeciras Conference (1906) and the Pact of Cartagena (1907), Spain occupied Ras Kebdana, a town near the Moulouya River, in March 1908.
[34] In December 1910 the King of Spain made a visit to Mellila, then inspected construction works in the Zaffarin islands, and reviewed troops in Selouane.
In 1911 the Shrarda and Banu Mtir tribes to the north and south of Meknes respectively, became alarmed by the French expansion in their direction from the west and rose in rebellion.
As the tribes advanced on Fes, the French, in violation of the Algeciras agreement,[20] were able to intervene on the pretext of defending the sultan and the Europeans in the capital.
A French column under General Moinier [fr] repulsed the tribes and occupied Meknes after taking Moulay al-Zayn captive on 8 June.
His real motive was to bring the French to the point of making a generous offer of Congo territory, and to emphasize to the Powers that the Algeciras Act had broken down.
[37] Many weeks before the Panther went to Agadir, Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had feared that Germany meant to seek her compensation in West Morocco and establish the naval base on the Atlantic coast.
London, alarmed that it had lost track of the German fleet for a time, brought the Royal Navy to a high state of alert.
Moroccan officials believed that Morocco would be given a regime similar to that of British Egypt, with considerable autonomy in crusial areas like justice and the internal workings of the administration.
Lyautey was quick to realize that the Bled el-Makhzen was, in his expression, the Maroc utile, the part containing the fertile lands and the mineral resources which the future settlers and the entrepreneurs would want to exploit.
Priority was consequently given in the extension of French control to the former Bled el-Makhzen, comprising the coastal plains and the regions of Fes, Meknes and Oujda.
Lyautey was able to disperse the tribesmen surrounding Fes, control agitation in the city itself, and start the conquest of the remaining parts of the Maroc utile.