[10] In 1937, Dollmann harangued Catholic chaplains for not being fervent enough in their support of the Nazi regime, telling them that as members of the Wehrmacht and bearers of National Socialism, they should always display "a clear and unresolved acknowledgment of the Führer, State, and People!

While the French Maginot Line had proven impregnable to frontal assault in the past, Hitler was unconcerned, as its defenses were easily outflanked during the invasion.

Along with Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, Dollmann was the only commander of the western campaign who did not see service against the Soviet Union along the Eastern Front.

Instead he became complacent, overweight, and followed the lead of his immediate superior, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, neglecting the coastal defenses of France in the process.

Only when his command came under Army Group B Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's scrutiny in December 1943 did Dollmann begin decisive and feverish construction to improve French coastal fortifications.

[20] Dollman tried to enjoy his time living in France during the occupation, frequently attending religious services and visiting cathedrals and museums.

[21] Meanwhile, Dollmann's deteriorating health was mirrored in his diminishing knowledge of battlefield tactics and the importance of air superiority – all of which made him under-prepared for the imminent Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day.

Panzer Group West Commander Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg later confirmed that Dollmann had a much better understanding of the use of armored troops than was previously supposed.

[22] History was soon to prove that the German defenses were inadequate to repulse the massive and highly coordinated assault which took place on 6 June 1944.

[23] Up to 60 German divisions were tasked with defending 3,000 kilometres (1,900 mi) of coastline from the Riviera to the North Sea, composed of varying troops – Cossacks, Volga Tartars, Georgians, among others, equipped with weapons captured from France, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Deception measures by the Allied intelligence services kept the Germans convinced that the attack would occur near Norway or close to Calais.

[26] Although reconnaissance reports as late as 5 June 1944 indicated that something significant was afoot, none of this intelligence was relayed to the OKW at Berchtesgaden, nor was it forwarded to Dollmann's 7th Army.

[27] It is doubtful whether this would have led to a redistribution of forces, since Hitler remained convinced that the main Allied attack would occur at Pas de Calais.

By nightfall June 6, up to 130,000 troops and approximately 800 Allied tanks [citation needed] were ashore under a curtain of naval bombardment.

Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein protested; he felt a column march in daytime was merely an invitation to the Allied air forces to decimate his division.

Throughout the night of 6–7 June 1944, the Allies used their knowledge of the location of the German columns and flares to illuminate the enemy to find suitable targets to attack from the air.

[31] Part of the effort to repel the Allied attack included strategic placement of troops over what appeared to be a growing front.

Throughout the course of defending the coastline and in spite of the disastrous circumstances, Dollmann continued to discipline his soldiers by the threat of severe penalties.