One of the arguments he raised against the truthfulness of these doctrines is that they are based upon the concept of free will, which, in his opinion, does not exist.
[1][2] In The Gay Science, Nietzsche praises Arthur Schopenhauer's "immortal doctrines of the intellectuality of intuition, the apriority of the law of causality, (...) and the non-freedom of the will,[3]" which have not been assimilated enough by the disciples.
In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche criticizes the concept of free will both negatively and positively.
)[12] Next, he argues that free will generally represents an error of causa sui: The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness.
The term "me" (as in the statements "it's up to me", "it is you who willed that") had already been recognized as empty in the preface of Beyond Good and Evil[17] (or as connected with the superstition about the soul).
It's good if we do nothing; we are not strong enough for that" – but this bitter state, this shrewdness of the lowest ranks, which even insects possess (when in great danger they stand as if they were dead in order not to do "too much"), has, thanks to that counterfeiting and self-deception of powerlessness, dressed itself in the splendour of a self-denying, still, patient virtue, just as if the weakness of the weak man himself – that means his essence, his actions, his entire single, inevitable, and irredeemable reality – is a voluntary achievement, something willed, chosen, an act, something of merit.The same however can be applied to the moral weakness of a Christian (his lack of resistance), who would certainly prefer not to sin and would construct himself otherwise if he could.
But the latter case means we have no will in a topic, i.e. it is at that time morally indifferent to us, adiaphora, not opposed to anything (and therefore even more there is no guilt).
If randomness affects a man (unsubjugated, reaching even the surface of his consciousness), then "unfree will" occurs.
And indeed Nietzsche says it with the mouth of Zarathustra: The same in Beyond Good and Evil: Artists have here perhaps a finer intuition; they who know only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything "arbitrarily," and everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, of subtlety, of power, of creatively fixing, disposing, and shaping, reaches its climax — in short, that necessity and "freedom of will" are then the same thing with them.
[26]Yet in another part of Zarathustra Nietzsche claims that when we look long-term enough and from the bird's-eye perspective of supreme powers big enough, a chance is unimportant, because it is subject to and step-by-step softened and arranged by natural laws and necessities which constitute the order of the world and evolution: If ever a breath hath come to me of the creative breath, and of the heavenly necessity which compelleth even chances to dance star-dances: (...)[27]To Nietzsche everything in this world is an expression of will to power.
[28][29] To exist is to represent will to power, to cause influence (compare similar views of Protagoras' disciples in Plato's Theaetetus).
[30] Contrary to Chesterton's views, this general rule is not precluded even by absolute chances: they of course change the course of the world too, but still: if one thing was set otherwise, everything would have to be otherwise.
[33]Because causa sui is according to Nietzsche a nonsense, even to a chance could get a basis attributed (only "the whole" has no basis), and it would be "divine dice" (or "Divine Plan"): To Nietzsche no one is responsible either for the necessities (laws and powers) he represents, or for chances he encounters (which conquer him unwillingly – and which, as things totally independent from anything, only the "supreme being" could change); after all, no one is absolutely and completely resistant, there can always happen something which changes one deeply enough.
[34]In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche discusses fatalism and responsibility in these words: What alone can our teaching be?
– That no one gives a man his qualities, neither God, nor society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself (the latter absurd idea here put aside has been taught as "intelligible freedom" by Kant, perhaps also by Plato).
–[35]Nietzsche's critique of free will has essentially two aspects: one is philosophical (fatalistic), and the other is psychological.
[36] Fatalism lets Nietzsche theoretically prove the error of moral doctrines, which – most generally speaking – would require that a sinner changed his destiny (for instance by changing the laws of nature, influencing chances which lie completely beyond the extent of his influence), which is by definition impossible.
But such theory would not be convincing enough if at the same time the impression of control was not removed, as well as the ever renewed attempts at associating it with the "freedom of will" and building a philosophy out of that.
[38] Aim could then be interpreted, according to a common definition, as planning and intellectual foreseeing[39] (of especially effects); according to Nietzsche first and foremost the anticipation of acts which in fact do not need to follow by its virtue from aiming (which is here foreseeing).
The idea of consciousness ("spirit") or, later, that of the ego [I] (the "subject") as a cause are only afterbirths: first the causality of the will was firmly accepted as proved, as a fact, and these other concepts followed from it.
[43] This non-deriving of acts straight way out of aims, which are just foreseeing (the accompanying self-consciousness of that what is to come), but searching for their sources elsewhere (for example in reflexes, habits, urges) is to Nietzsche even one of major differences between medieval (Thomist) and modern psychology.
[38] Nietzsche's words turned out to be prophetic,[36] for modern neuroscience, especially the famous Libet's[44][45] (or Kornhuber's[46]) experiment and other of this type, has not once confirmed that the decision for an act is made beyond the (self)consciousness (in popular words, the will), which comes up to even half a second later.
"[51] In Twilight of the Idols (see the quote above) and later in The Antichrist[52] all concepts which explain life as a test or raise an (externally reasonable) moral "task," "purpose" or the "will of God" are considered false.
They are a part of the "error of free will"[35] consisting in incomprehension of fatalism of life, i.e. the fact that it is shaped by higher forces.
A priest, a moralist does in fact nothing for man's "salvation," but just rules, and even when doing so he acts in a way that would (apart from that) be considered immoral.
He claims that it was not the aim of the latter to have anybody serve him, for God rules everything anyway; to the contrary, in Nietzsche's opinion Jesus fought with churchedness and the notion of sin rooted in the Old Testament.
The very "freedom of will" was invented by the priests in order to master the process of human thinking – and nothing more.
[52] The downfall of Christian values is not an effect – as it has been presented hitherto – of human free will.
The supreme values (especially formerly common in European culture) overthrow each other themselves[55] due to inner contradictions[56] and non-matching the nature.
[58]It was also connected to individualism through desire: We, however, want to become who we are — human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves!