[2][3] That type of experiment could then help reveal which parts of the virus's genome correspond to the species that it can infect, enabling the creation of antiviral medicines which block this function.
[4] The term "gain of function" is sometimes applied more narrowly to refer to "research which could enable a pandemic-potential pathogen to replicate more quickly or cause more harm in humans or other closely-related mammals.
[19][20][7][21] In January 2020, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity convened an expert panel to revisit the rules for gain-of-function research and provide more clarity in how such experiments are approved, and when they should be disclosed to the public.
"[33] Questions were raised by other scientists including Marc Lipsitch of the T. H. Chan School of Public Health at Harvard University about the relative risks and benefits of this research.
The European Academies of Science Advisory Council (EASAC) concluded that all required laws, rules, regulations, and codes of conduct are in place in several EU countries to continue this type of work responsibly.
Jeremy Farrar, director of the Oxford University Clinical Research Unit in Ho Chi Minh City, described the work as "remarkable" and said that it demonstrated the "very real threat" that "continued circulation of H5N1 strains in Asia and Egypt" poses.
[36] A preprint by Boston University researchers, published on 14 October 2022, described their experiments splicing the SARS-CoV-2 BA.1 Omicron's spike protein into an ancestral SARS-CoV-2 variant isolated in the early days of the pandemic, creating a new chimeric version of the virus.
)[39][40] On 17 October, the Daily Mail ran the headline "Boston University CREATES a new COVID strain that has an 80% kill rate—echoing dangerous experiments feared to have started the pandemic".
PolitiFact noted the "lab leak" theory was unproven, and also stated "citing the 80% figure alone leaves out key context, including that the resulting strain was less fatal than the original, which killed 100% of mice.
The event was attended by scientists from around the world, including George Gao, Gabriel Leung and Michael Selgelid, Baruch Fischhoff, Alta Charo, Harvey Fineberg, Jonathan Moreno, Ralph Cicerone, Margaret Hamburg, Jo Handelsman, Samuel Stanley, Kenneth Berns, Ralph Baric, Robert Lamb, Silja Vöneky, Keiji Fukuda, David Relman, and Marc Lipsitch.
[44] On March 10–11, 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held its second public symposium to discuss potential U.S. government policies for the oversight of gain-of-function (GOF) research.
[50][52][53] The group engaged in public advocacy, influencing the US government's decision in December 2014 to suspend funding of research that would create certain types of novel potential pandemic pathogens.
[57] He and other SfS signatories have argued that these pathogens are already subject to extensive regulations and that it would be more advantageous and effective to focus on improving lab safety and oversight, ensuring that experiments are conducted in the public interest.
[58][59] Notable signatories are Constance Cepko, Dickson Despommier, Erica Ollmann Saphire, Geoffrey Smith, Karla Kirkegaard, Sean Whelan, Vincent Racaniello and Yoshihiro Kawaoka.
[67] The NEC also proposed a national code-of-conduct for researchers to consent, endorsing which experiments qualify as misconduct and which do not, based on founding principles of public benefit.
On 19 December 2017, the NIH lifted the moratorium because gain-of-function research was deemed "important in helping us identify, understand, and develop strategies and effective countermeasures against rapidly evolving pathogens that pose a threat to public health.
[81][82][83][84] In January 2021, University of Saskatchewan virologist Angela Rasmussen wrote that one version of the information invoked previous gain-of-function work on coronaviruses to promulgate the idea that the virus was of laboratory origin.
Rasmussen stated that this was unlikely, due to the intense scrutiny and government oversight to which GoFR is subject, and it is improbable that research on hard-to-obtain coronaviruses could occur under the radar.
[86][87] NIH funding to the EcoHealth Alliance and later sub-contracted to the Wuhan Institute of Virology was not to support gain-of-function experiments, but instead to enable the collection of bat samples in the wild.
[86] The Washington Post also quoted Rutgers University biosecurity expert Richard Ebright's dissenting opinion about Fauci's testimony, demonstrating that there is disagreement about what qualifies as "gain of function" research.
Ebright has remarked that the process is not applied to all experiments which are implicated in the government's policies, while virologists David Relman and Angela Rasmussen have cited a worrying lack of transparency from oversight panels.