Georg Cornelius Adalbert von[1] der Marwitz (7 July 1856 – 27 October 1929) was a Prussian cavalry general, who commanded several Imperial German armies during the First World War on both the Eastern and Western fronts.

In December 1916, Marwitz – a highly experienced and well-known officer, who sported a noticeable white moustache –[2] was transferred from his post with the Kaiser, to take command of the Second Army on the Western Front.

Each system was built with deep concrete bunkers, massed machine guns in cover, and as much as 50 yards of barbed wire in front.

For most of 1917, following instructions from his superior, Generalfeldmarschal Crown Prince Rupprecht, Marwitz kept his units busy with patrols and collecting intelligence, especially taking prisoners during trench raids on the British lines.

Despite statements by prisoners, the presence of camouflaged tanks, and air reconnaissance revealing a build-up in the rear, Marwitz concluded that an attack was unlikely.

[4] As a result, Marwitz was still in bed at the le Cateau HQ when he first heard of the British tank offensive toward Bourlon Ridge, which they had identified as a vital strategic target.

[6] The Battle of Cambrai ensued, which saw the most extensive use of tanks to date, more than twice the previous number in one engagement, as well as new combined arms tactics.

During the massive German offensive of Operation Michael, in March-April 1918, Second Army achieved the most significant advances, breaking through at the point in the line where French and British sectors met.

However, these successes were halted at Villers-Bretonneux, where two understrength and hastily-deployed Australian infantry brigades stepped into the gaps between British divisions.

Its weakness lay in the fact that half the troops were recent recruits and of diminishing quality, following the reduction of previous minimum physical requirements.

Crown Prince Rupprecht warned only a complete retreat to reform in a stronger position alongside Ninth Army would suffice; but Ludendorff turned down flat any idea of it; the line was to be held at all costs.

But otherwise, tanks created panic and chaos in the German ranks; front-line troops who bound grenades together as makeshift anti-tank bombs and rifles were abandoned for heavy machine-guns, leaving artillery unprotected in the rearguard.

[13] Meanwhile, the Allies had been planning massive operations to encircle Second Army from north and south, and outflank the town of Montdidier in an elaborate pincer movement.

[15] One of the strongest positions held by the German forces was the village of Peronne: surrounded by marshes, Marwitz had ordered the destruction of all bridges in the sector.

The Australian Corps, headed by General Sir John Monash arrived on 26 August 1918, to prepare an assault over open ground that would normally have been extremely risky and vulnerable to German defensive fire and counterattacks.

He attempted to instill discipline in troops fleeing before allied tanks, "its just the fear of those things and not their actual effect", he wrote in his diary entry of 29 September.

[16] All along the Meuse-Argonne Front the Franco-American forces made progress north, supported by tanks; the Germans tried to reply with artillery and machine-gun fire proving stiff resistance.

[20] Marwitz was in favour of withdrawing Fifth Army behind the relatively safety of the east bank of the Meuse, to re-group and get some rest, but OHL refused, sending strict orders to stand and fight.

General Hunter Liggett interpreted this as a weakness that had anticipated an attack on their right flank, but when it came in caused the line to collapse in depth.