Lieutenant-General Sir George Montague Harper, KCB, DSO (11 January 1865 – 15 December 1922), was a senior officer of the British Army during the First World War.

It was widely claimed by tank officers that his adoption of idiosyncratic tactics at Cambrai caused his division's failure to reach its objectives, although this view has now been called into question.

[6] In 1899 he was deployed to South Africa where he joined 37th Field Company Royal Engineers and saw action at Spion Kop, Val Kranz, Tugela Heights and Pieter's Hill.

[9] Following his graduation from Camberley, he was appointed a staff captain at headquarters on 15 October 1902,[10] before being made a deputy assistant quartermaster general in July 1903.

[20] On the outbreak of war Colonel Harper was placed in charge of the Oa (planning operations and written orders) section at BEF GHQ.

[23] Robertson, now BEF chief of staff, removed Harper – who had been promoted temporary brigadier-general in November - "in a very untactful way" (Rawlinson diary 29 Jan & 8 Feb 1915) whilst Wilson was away touring the French front.

[4] Spears commented on Harper's interest in training prior to the Battle of Arras, and remarked on the steep improvement in many divisions in this regard since the Somme.

[23] Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Nicholson commented that his experience of working with Territorials made him the right man to encourage the individualism of Highlanders, and that he had "the makings of a great general".

[23] In June 1917 Wilson – who had himself just declined the job - recommended Harper for command of XIII Corps, but Haig appointed Frederick McCracken instead.

These tactics were based on previous experience of infantry-tank cooperation, and concern that infantry in column might suffer excess casualties before being able to return fire.

[37] Christopher Baker-Carr later claimed in his memoirs (From Chauffeur to Brigadier – 1930) that the attack on Flesquieres failed as a result of Harper using his own idiosyncratic tactical drill.

[38] To retake Fontaine on 23 November, Harper concurred with the brigade commander Henry Pelham Burn's suggestion to attack with only two of his seven battalions in a misguided attempt to conserve lives.

[39] Bryn Hammond attributes Harper's failure to take Flesquieres to a strong German defence, to the holding back of his reserve brigade, and partly to the overextended command and control structure (Harper had sited his HQ too far back, 8,000 yards (over 4.5 miles) behind the original British front line, and 7 miles from Flesquieres).

[4] Harper and his colleague, Lieutenant General Aylmer Haldane, GOC VI Corps, are described by Travers as "seasoned and reliable commanders".

[44] In September, during the Hundred Days Offensive, during the period after the Battle of Albert and whilst Byng's Third Army was advancing towards the Hindenburg Line, Haldane regularly vented in his diary about Harper's supposed shortcomings.

[4] On 15 December 1922 Harper was driving from Sherborne to Bradford Abbas when his car skidded and overturned, he died of a fractured skull and his wife was injured.