[7] However, as World War II went on, the OKW found itself exercising an increasing amount of direct command authority over military units, particularly in the west.

The term Abwehr (German for "defence", here referring to counterintelligence) had been created just after World War I as an ostensible concession to Allied demands that Germany's intelligence activities be for defensive purposes only.

After 4 February 1938, the name Abwehr was changed to the Overseas Department/Office in Defence of the Armed Forces High Command (Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht).

These provisional combat groupings ranged from corps size, such as Army Detachment Kempf, to commands composed of companies or even platoons.

Blitzkrieg has been considered by many historians as having its roots in precepts developed by Fuller, Liddel-Hart, and Hans von Seeckt, and even having ancient prototypes practised by Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon.

[9][10] Recent studies of the Battle of France also suggest that the actions of either Erwin Rommel or Heinz Guderian or both of them (both had contributed to the theoretical development and early practices of what later became Blitzkrieg prior to World War II),[11][12] ignoring orders of superiors who had never foreseen such spectacular successes and thus prepared much more prudent plans, were conflated into a purposeful doctrine and created the first archetype of Blitzkrieg, which then gained a fearsome reputation that dominated the Allied leaders' minds.

Visser argues this allowed the German Army to achieve superior combat performance compared to a more traditional organisational doctrine like the American one; while this was ultimately offset by the Allies' superior numerical and materiel advantage, Visser argues that it allowed the German Army to resist far longer than if it had not adopted this method of organisation and doctrine.

In public opinion, the German military was and is sometimes seen as a high-tech army, since new technologies that were introduced before and during World War II influenced its development of tactical doctrine.

These technologies were featured by Nazi propaganda, but were often only available in small numbers or late in the war, as overall supplies of raw materials and armaments became low.

The other divisions continued to rely on horses for towing artillery, other heavy equipment, and supply wagons, and the men marched on foot or rode bicycles.

From June 1941 to the end of February 1942 German forces in the Soviet Union lost some 75,000 trucks, approximately half the number they had at the beginning of the campaign, to mechanical wear and tear and combat damage.

His commanders and peers, who were less experienced in the effect of Allied air power, disagreed vehemently with his suggestion, arguing that this would violate the prime principle of concentration of force.

[21] The army's lack of trucks and fuel to run them severely limited infantry movement, especially during and after the Normandy invasion when Allied air power devastated the French rail network north of the Loire.

Nazi propaganda had told German soldiers to wipe out what were variously called Jewish Bolshevik subhumans, the Mongol hordes, the Asiatic flood, and the red beast.