In October 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined the war on Germany's side, becoming part of the Central Powers.
One line of interpretation, promoted by German historian Fritz Fischer in the 1960s, argues that Germany had long desired to dominate Europe politically and economically, and seized the opportunity that unexpectedly opened in July 1914, making Germany guilty of starting the war.
[10] Wilhelm II, German Emperor, the Kaiser, was given enormous publicity by both sides and signed off on major decisions, but he was largely shunted aside or persuaded by others.
Bankers and financiers were not as pacifistic as their counterparts in London, but they did not play a large role in shaping foreign policy.
In the 1912 elections, the Socialists (Social Democratic Party or SPD), based in the labor unions, won 35% of the national vote.
Conservative elites exaggerated the implicit threats made by radical Socialists such as August Bebel and became alarmed.
Some looked to a foreign war as a solution to Germany's internal problems; others considered ways to suppress the Socialists.
When the war began, some conservatives wanted to use force to suppress the SPD, but Bethmann Hollweg wisely refused.
He argues, "The fact that so many plausible explanations for the outbreak of the war have been advanced over the years indicates on the one hand that it was massively overdetermined, and on the other that no effort to analyze the causal factors involved can ever fully succeed.
Historians have stressed that insecurity about the future deeply troubled German policy makers and motivated them toward preemptive war before it was too late.
[22] According to American historian Gordon A. Craig, it was after the set-back in Morocco in 1905 that the fear of encirclement began to be a potent factor in German politics.
She had encircled herself by alienating France over Alsace-Lorraine, Russia by her support of Austria-Hungary's anti--Slav policy in the Balkans, England by building her rival fleet.
[27]Bethmann Hollweg was mesmerized by the steady growth of Russian power, which was in large part due to French financial and technical assistance.
Bethmann Hollweg knew he was undertaking a calculated risk by backing a local war in which Austria would politically destroy Serbia.
Russia had no treaty obligations to Serbia, but was trying to fashion itself as the leader of the Slavic peoples in opposition to their German and Austrian oppressors.
Once France was knocked out, the German troops would be sent to the East to defeat Russia with the assistance of the Austrian army.
It called for a great infantry sweep through Belgium to encircle Paris and defeat France in a matter of weeks.
The plan was not shared with the Navy, the Foreign Office, the Chancellor, the main ally in Vienna, or the separate Army commands in Bavaria and the other states.
[35] In explaining why neutral Britain went to war with Germany, Paul Kennedy (1980) recognized it was critical for war that Germany become economically more powerful than Britain, but he downplays the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the Baghdad Railway, confrontations in Central and Eastern Europe, highly-charged political rhetoric and domestic pressure groups.
[36] The British Royal Navy dominated the globe in the 19th century, but after 1890, Germany attempted to challenge Britain's supremacy.
The main reason for the delay was the fact that practically the entire Austrian army was tied down at home in harvest work, providing a food supply that would be essential for any war once the reserves were called to duty.
Austria depended entirely on Germany for support – it had no other ally it could trust– but the Kaiser lost control of the German government.
Bethmann Hollweg had repeatedly rejected pleas from Britain and Russia to put pressure on Austria to compromise.
Now in late July he reversed himself, and pleaded, or demanded, that Austria accept mediation, warning that Britain would probably join Russia and France if a larger war started.
Germany, facing a two-front war, enacted what was known as the Schlieffen Plan, which involved German armed forces needing to move through Belgium and swing south into France and towards the French capital of Paris.
This plan aimed to gain a quick victory against the French and allow German forces to concentrate on the Eastern Front.
Germany attempted to justify its actions through the publication of selected diplomatic correspondence in the German White Book[48] which appeared on 4 August 1914, the same day as Britain's war declaration.
[52] In late 1913 German general Liman von Sanders was hired to reorganize the army, and to command the Ottoman forces at Constantinople.
This was resolved in June 1914 when Berlin agreed not to construct the line south of Baghdad and to recognize Britain's preponderant interest in the region.
[54] In June, 1914, Vienna and Berlin discussed bringing Bulgaria and Turkey into their military alliance to neutralize the threat of the Balkan League under Russian and French auspices.