The operation's strategy was to covertly cross the Line of Control (LoC) and incite the Muslim-majority Kashmiri population's uprising against the Indian Government.

[11] The military leadership believed that a rebellion (sparked by Operation Gibraltar) by the local Kashmiri population against Indian authorities would serve as Pakistan's casus belli against India on the international stage.

In August 1965, India crossed the ceasefire line, and attacked the Haji Pir pass inside Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir.

Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic[22] from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt.

[23] These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir.

Backed by then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained irregular force of some 40,000 men, highly motivated and well armed.

"[27] As a result, groundwork and intelligence gathering for execution of the plan was laid by launching "Operation Nusrat", the purpose of which was to locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) that were to serve as entry points for the mujahideen, and to gauge the response of the Indian army and the local population.

Several columns were to occupy key heights around the Kashmir valley and encourage a general revolt, which would be followed by direct combat by Pakistani troops.

Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare would commence, destroying bridges, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking airfields,[33] with a view to create the conditions of an "armed insurrection" in Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule.

[41] While the covert infiltration was a complete failure that ultimately led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, military analysts have differed on whether the plan itself was flawed.

Some have held that the plan was well-conceived but was let down by poor execution[citation needed], but almost all Pakistani and neutral analysts have maintained that the entire operation was "a clumsy attempt"[42] and doomed to collapse.