The Supreme Court conceded that the law completely prohibited a prior use by Mr. Goldblatt who had operated a gravel pit for 30 years.

Goldblatt argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was not regulatory of his business but was completely prohibitory and confiscated his property without compensation, that it deprived him of the benefit of the favorable judgment arising from the previous zoning litigation, and that it constituted ex post facto legislation.

Mr. Goldblatt argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it '1) was not regulatory of his business but completely prohibitory and confiscated his property without compensation, 2) it deprived him of the benefit of the favorable judgement arising from the previous zoning litigation, and 3) it constituted ex post facto legislation.'

Justice Clark wrote that the real question was whether or not it fell within the town's police power to prohibit further excavation below the water table.

The guiding principles about police power that Justice Clark took from Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) were: Does the public require this interference and are the remedies reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?

Justice Clark referenced past cases of Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), and United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 146 (1938), all of which were decided that similar situations regarding reasonableness had not been disproved, so he concluded that this must stand as a valid policing regulation.

Justice Clark addressed Goldblatt's further claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it imposed upon him to re-fill the excavation and to erect a new fence or to face penalties or imprisonment.