David Gordon Lunan (December 31, 1914 – October 3, 2005) was a Canadian Army officer who, in 1946, was convicted of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
Lunan had acted as a handler for three other accused spies: Israel Halperin, Edward Mazerall, and Durnford Smith.
[4][6] Lunan became active in a number of political movements, such as the Quebec Committee for Allied Victory and the communist Labor-Progressive Party (LLP).
[4] In his 1995 memoir, The Making of a Spy: A Political Odyssey, he wrote: I admired the Soviet Union for what I believed then to be its enlightened worldview.
RCMP claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the real glue that abound me to my comrades and them to me was the shared desire for a more humane society, a fairer distribution of wealth.
According to the testimony he would later give to the Kellock–Taschereau Commission, he arrived in his office one morning to find an anonymous note on his desk, inviting him to meet an unnamed person at a corner on Rideau Street.
[9] According to his memoir, he received an anonymous phone call from a young woman instructing him to meet her at the Château Laurier.
[11] Rogov proved rigidly secretive and their initial meeting was brief; the two men climbed into the back of a chauffeur-driven car and the vehicle took off.
Rogov briefly questioned Lunan about his job and handed him a white envelope with instructions to destroy it after he had read its contents.
Lunan's career in journalism offered him cover for recruiting informants, some of whom were led to believe they were speaking to him in his capacity as editor of Canadian Affairs.
From March to August 1945, he passed along 17 secret reports – totalling 700 pages – on radar systems, radio tubes, and microwaves.
[18] The Soviets assigned Lunan a lengthy list of objectives regarding Halperin; among other things, they wanted him to provide information regarding Canadian research on explosives and, in particular, supply samples of uranium.
Lunan reported to Rogov, "It is impossible to get anything from him except... verbal descriptions, and I am not in a position to understand everything fully where it concerns technical details."
[21] Finally, in late July 1945, Lunan approached him under the guise that the editor of an army newspaper was looking for information on developments in radar technology.
Mazerall gave him two documents marked "confidential" – a research proposal and a paper on air navigation that was set to be presented at an upcoming symposium in London which the Soviets would be attending.
[1] Rather, his usefulness was limited to the extent he could extract information from Halperin, Mazerall, and Smith and he did not have the scientific literacy to act as an effective go-between.
[29] The Soviet Union had been devastated by the Second World War and the standard of living in his country could not compare to that afforded by his post in Canada.
[32] Eager to avoid repatriation, he gathered more than 100 documents that implicated a number of Canadians – including Lunan – and defected from the embassy on September 5.
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King had been hesitant to get involved out of fear of damaging relations with the Soviet Union and undermining talks about nuclear weapons control.
[38] Additionally, the Soviet Union had largely ceased its espionage activities within Canada following Gouzenko's defection and the suspects posed no immediate threat to Canadian security.
[5] He was initially tasked with providing publicity for the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, but he ended up as a speechwriter for Paul Martin Sr., King's Secretary of State for External Affairs.
[56] At one point, Harvison, evidently unaware that Lunan's wife was Jewish, resorted to anti-Semitism, asking him "Are you going to stand by and let people with names like Rosenberg, Kogan, Mazerall, Rabinovitch, and Halperin sell Canada down the river?
[43] On February 20, investigators reported in a memorandum to MI6: After long and delicate interrogation, during which was told of overwhelming evidence against him, LUNAN was finally brought to point where he stated he might be prepared to assist Canadian government and that he could be of great help.
[58]On March 4, 1946, the Commission released an interim report publicly identifying four of the detainees: Lunan, Mazerall, Kathleen Willsher, and Emma Woikin.
[61] The Crown had determined it could not pursue charges of treason since the information had been shared with the Soviet Union, which was Canada's ally at the time.
Lunan described the conditions as "psychological torture", citing his isolation, the 24-hour lighting, and Harvison's "highly vindictive" attitude, though he could not identify any specific instances of physical threats or intimidation.
He stated that ignorance of the law was not a defence and claimed the accused could have avoided self-incrimination by demanding protection under the Canada Evidence Act.
The following Monday, November 18, McDougall found Lunan guilty of conspiracy and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment at Kingston Penitentiary.
In his decision, McDougall cited "an overwhelming mass of evidence" and told Smith, "It is extremely unfortunate that a man of your abilities [should be guilty of such a crime]."
The primary difference between the two books is an epilogue in the latter where he said he acted "naively, stupidly and admittedly outside the law" and expressed regret over his role in the Gouzenko Affair and bringing about the Cold War in Canada.