The eventual site for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was identified by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in the course of the Blue Nile survey, which was conducted between 1956 and 1964 during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie.

[19] On 31 March 2011, a day after the project was made public, a US$4.8 billion contract was awarded without competitive bidding to Italian company Salini Impregilo, and the dam's foundation stone was laid on 2 April 2011 by the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

[27] The Government of Egypt, a country which depends on the Nile for about 90% of its water,[28] has demanded that Ethiopia cease construction on the dam as a precondition to negotiations, has sought regional support for its position, and some political leaders have discussed methods to sabotage it.

[36] Ethiopia has been forced to finance the GERD with crowdsourcing through internal fundraising in the form of selling bonds and persuading employees to contribute a portion of their incomes.

[37] Contributions are made in the newly official website confirmed by the verified account of the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia[38] Of the total cost, 1 billion US dollars for turbines and electrical equipment was funded by the Exim Bank of China.

In March 2012, Salini awarded the Italian firm Tratos Cavi SPA a contract to supply low and high voltage cable for the dam.

[70] The second phase of filling of the GERD reservoir was completed on 19 July 2021,[71] with estimates of reaching the level of 573 metres (1,880 ft) (a.m.s.l) and retaining no more than 4.5 km3 (1.1 cu mi) at this stage.

The emergency spillway located near the rock saddle dam saw an increase of the rim length from 300 m to 1,200 m to account even for the largest possible flood of the river.

The engineering works then had to be adjusted, with digging and excavating deeper than originally planned,[citation needed] which took extra time and capacity and also required more concrete.

The installed power of 6.450 MW in combination with the size of the reservoir will help to manage the side effects of the next severe drought, when other hydropower plants have to stop their operations.

[82] The eventual surplus electricity of GERD which does not fit the demand inside Ethiopia, is then to be sold and exported to neighbouring countries including Sudan and possibly Egypt, but also Djibouti.

Powerplants that have been readied or are under construction in Ethiopia, such as Gilgel Gibe III or Koysha, whose exports (if given surplus energy) will mainly be going to Kenya through a 500 kV HVDC line.

[98] An independent assessment estimated that at least 5,110 people will be resettled from the reservoir and downstream area, and the dam is expected to lead to a significant change in the fish ecology.

Except for a few older people, almost all locals interviewed "expressed hope that the project brings something of benefit to them" in terms of education and health services or electricity supply based on the information available to them.

Studies indicate that the primary factors that will govern the impact during the reservoir-filling phase include the initial reservoir elevation of the Aswan High Dam, the rainfall that occurs during the filling period, and the negotiated agreement between the three countries.

However, if the countries can reach a compromise, the increased storage in Ethiopia can provide a greater buffer to shortages in Sudan and Egypt during years of future drought.

[116] On 3 June 2013, while discussing the International Panel of Experts report with President Mohammad Morsi, Egyptian political leaders suggested methods to destroy the dam, including support for anti-government rebels.

[117] Morsi's top aide apologised for the "unintended embarrassment" and his cabinet released a statement promoting "good neighbourliness, mutual respect and the pursuit of joint interests without either party harming the other."

[32][121] The campaign is intensive and wide-reaching; in March 2014, for the first time, only Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania were invited by Egypt to participate in the Nile Hockey Tournament.

"[125] Beginning in November 2019, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin facilitated negotiations between the governments of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan with respect to the filling and the operation of the dam.

Ethiopians online expressed anger using the hashtag #itismydam over what they claim was the US and the World Bank's siding with Egypt contrary to the co-observer role initially promised.

[130] In September 2020, the United States suspended part of its economic assistance to Ethiopia due to the lack of sufficient progress in negotiations with Sudan and Egypt over the construction of the dam.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed responded that "Ethiopia will not cave in to aggression of any kind" and that threats were "misguided, unproductive and clear violations of international law.

"[132] In April 2021, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi warned: "I am telling our brothers in Ethiopia, let’s not reach the point where you touch a drop of Egypt’s water, because all options are open.

[138] During Joe Biden's July 2022 meeting in the Middle East, he met with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and restated American support for Egypt's "water security" and "forging a diplomatic resolution that would achieve the interests of all parties and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous region.

Egyptian military officials primarily cite concerns about water-sharing, whereas Khartoum has alleged that it had not received certain guarantees from the Ethiopian government related to the purchasing of electricity generated by the GERD in the future.

[144][145] Some observers speculate that as the GERD project nears completion, Ethiopia's negotiating leverage increases relative to that of Sudan and Egypt, further inciting global concern over a future conflict between the nations in the Nile region.

In 2021, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed, in a move sparking controversy throughout the continent and Europe, invited a South African delegation, including government and quasi-government figures, to Addis Ababa.

[147] Among them were ex-members of the TRAKboys, a south African political group accused of operating in conjunction with and financing rebel factions throughout the continent, allegedly tasked with facilitating back-door discussions with the officials in Khartoum and Cairo on behalf of Ethiopia.

According to AP, this came to light when members of the Wagner Group, a Russian private security firm operating in Sudan since 2017, attempted to attack a TRAKboy delegation they claimed they mistook for illegal gold smugglers.